United States

Americans appear more secure, as their overall level of concern is relatively low compared with other polled nations. Having said that, their prevailing concerns are economic crises (76%), wars and conflicts (75%) and cyber-attacks (at 71%, higher than the survey average of 64%).

Americans appear most satisfied regarding their country’s international standing. Only 38% feel that their country does not have the status it deserves, while 47% believe it does. Some 61% perceive their well-being as linked to the prosperity of other countries, showing an increased understanding of interconnected global prosperity (2021: 54%).

Americans exhibit moderate support for multilateralism, a slight improvement on the last survey. A majority support a stronger role for the UN (57%), NATO (53%, but only 42% among those aged 18–29), and the EU (46%). But although 36% support a bigger role for the OSCE, 16% answer ‘don’t know’ and 30% admit to being unfamiliar with the organisation.

71% of Americans wish to reduce dependence on China, compared with 53% on average in polled EU countries.

Americans believe that the age of American supremacy may be over (43% agree, 39% oppose). Most polled countries agree, except for outliers such as Georgia (54%) and Ukraine (52%), who still believe in it. Americans appear to anticipate an era defined by wars, conflicts and a »my country first« approach. Confidence in laws and rules in international relations persists, with only 38% professing to believe that they are no longer relevant (much lower than the 47% survey average). 

In the international context, the US compared with the EU sees itself as engaged in a broader conflict with both Russia and China. US–Russia (57%) and US–China (53%) relations are perceived as characterised by contradictory interests, followed by EU–China (43%). However, Americans’ perceptions of these contradictions appear to be less pronounced than those of other respondents.

Russia perceives the US as its main adversary. These days, however, the US does not reciprocate this view, instead focusing on China, particularly in economic terms. For instance, there is a strong US desire to reduce dependence on China, even if it negatively impacts living standards (71%, one of the highest values in the survey). The average of polled EU citizens is much lower at 53%. At the same time, support for closer cooperation with China increased among American respondents, rising from 30% in 2021 to 40%. Tensions and structural challenges define US–China relations: on average, 54% of Americans and 53% of respondents in our 14-country sample fear a new Cold War. 

The Biden administration has struggled to rally European allies behind its China policy, and as already mentioned, the Trump administration may link support on this issue to American participation in European security. 

When it comes to Russia, Americans demonstrate a more pragmatic perception. Closer cooperation is rejected by 53%, but 31% (above the NATO average of 25%) favour it. Nevertheless, 68% desire to minimise dependence on Russia.
Fears that broader global conflicts may impact the US remain high. Some 77% of Americans express concern about a direct impact of wars on their country, and 41% (above the 32% survey average) are worried about a new world war.

Americans view themselves as highly capable of defence in the event of a Russian attack, with 70% expressing confidence, much higher than the 28% average. 

70% of Americans view their country as highly capable of defence in the event of a Russian attack.

Perceptions of media reporting are split, with 39% seeing it as biased and 37% (2021: 31%) as objective. America’s media landscape is politicised and polarised. Media outlets have long reflected partisan divides, including greater influence of billionaires. This is partly reflected in perceptions of objectivity, which are significantly stronger among Democrats (48%) than among Republicans (31%). 

With President Biden fostering closer ties, the US and the EU have strengthened their transatlantic security partnership. Public opinion reflects broad support for closer cooperation with the EU. However, future dynamics under president Trump remain uncertain.

When it comes to European security, Russia is seen as the primary threat (73%). But US respondents’ perception of the Chinese threat (59%) is significantly higher than the 44% EU average. Some 40% of Americans view NATO enlargement as a potential threat to European security, a substantially higher proportion than before Russia started its full-scale war against Ukraine (2021: 28%). Only 36% perceive EU enlargement towards the East as a threat.

44% endorse providing additional weapons to Ukraine, thereof 60% Democrats and 35% Republicans.

The US has long advocated that Europe should step up its responsibility for its own defence. In line with that, Americans have more confidence (41%) in Europe's defence capabilities without US involvement than the European average (31%). Notably, however, 71% still support continuing US provision of security for Europe. Some 48% cite conditions, such as a fairer financial contribution from Europe (33%) and direct European support for US defence expenditures (30%), but a mere 11% cite European support for US China policy as a condition. Support for an EU Army has also surged, increasing from 39% in 2021 to 52%. This may reflect the wish that Europe take care of its own defence. Support for the EU's role in promoting international peace through non-military means, such as diplomacy, has risen from 56% in 2021 to 63%. In EU security policies, Americans favour leadership by the Weimar Triangle of Germany, France and Poland (35%), but a notable 25% answer ‘don’t know’.

Since February 2022, Washington has led support for Kyiv and strengthened NATO's deterrence capabilities. The US has been the major provider of military aid to Ukraine and crucial in coordinating NATO’s response. 
The majority of Americans hold Russia responsible for the war, which over half believe is aimed at expanding Russia’s territory. Overall, in accordance with the NATO average there is support for further aid to Ukraine, with 50% of Americans in favour (although while 70% of Democrats are on board, only 33% of Republicans follow suit). Furthermore, 37% of Americans would prefer a diplomatic solution, 31% favour aid until victory for Ukraine, and 19% favour a neutral stance.

Providing additional weapons to Ukraine is endorsed by 44% (60% Democrats, 35% Republicans), the third-highest value among polled NATO countries. Notably 23% are in favour of sending troops, a level of support surpassed only by Sweden (27%).

Economic and humanitarian aid each receive support from just under 25%. Support for Ukraine’s integration into NATO and the EU has increased significantly, with approval for NATO membership rising from 38% in 2021 to 54%, and for EU membership from 37% to 53%.

Diplomacy is seen as the most likely path to ending the war, with 35% expecting a negotiated settlement, while 25% foresee no end to the conflict. However, 36% believe it is most important to stop the war even if it means Ukraine losing control of some areas to Russia. Some 31% support continuing the war to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Meanwhile, 12% consider it most important that Russia lose the war, even if it means a risk of escalation. 
Among Americans, there is notable optimism that the war will end within the next 12 months, second only to Russia. 

The outlook for the next five years appears less bleak than in 2021, with expected improvements in the US (41%) and in Europe (31%). Only regarding global developments does pessimism (38%) exceed optimism (30%).

The main thrust of public sentiment is towards domestic affairs. Americans therefore remain cautious about taking on more international responsibilities, with only a slight increase in support under Biden from 38% in 2021 to 42%. However, support for reducing dependency on states with different values is notably high at 71% and has increased significantly (2021: 51%). Although 65% prioritise their own well-being over international involvement, 57% support an active foreign policy. 

Foreign policy priorities are fighting terrorism and extremism (57%), addressing human rights violations (43%), tackling climate change (39%) and resolving geopolitical tensions (31%, well up from 18% in 2021). When asked about strategies for promoting peace, Americans favour international institutions (38%), diplomatic efforts (36%) and promotion of economic interdependence (33%, the highest value in the poll). Isolationist sentiments are reflected in preferences regarding the future focus of US foreign policy, but without significant changes compared with 2021. Most respondents prefer limitations on US involvement (29%), followed by a focus on China (15%), Europe (14%) and the Middle East (12%). However, a significant portion (23%) responded ‘don’t know’.