The United Kingdom has a long colonial history and is a nuclear power with global influence. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and a founding member of NATO. It joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, later than many European neighbours, due to internal divisions and disagreements with France. In the wake of EEC accession, the United Kingdom faced internal and external challenges, including the Falklands War, the conflict in Northern Ireland and a fundamental financial and economic restructuring under Margaret Thatcher. The United Kingdom has taken on significant international responsibilities, particularly in Kosovo, Iraq and Libya. UK policies have been defined by its 2021 departure from the EU as a consequence of the 2016 Brexit referendum. In 2023, the UK updated its security strategy to adapt to a changing global order, signalling a more pragmatic foreign policy. The newly elected Labour Party is expected to have a positive impact on UK–EU relations.
The United Kingdom seems one of the most confident and secure countries in our sample. UK citizens seem to worry less: nearly half of respondents are not worried about their personal future, the lowest percentage in the survey. The overall level of concern is relatively low compared with other polled nations. Main issues that cause concern are inflation (83%), economic crises (78%), and wars and conflicts (78%). One outcome of Brexit seems to be that British people are the least worried about disagreements within the European Union.
A strong sense of security prevails, with 88% reporting feeling safe in their immediate environment. This figure is above average and is noteworthy in light of the new governments declared focus on safer streets.
British respondents feel most satisfied with the status of their country in the international arena.
British people feel most satisfied among the poll respondents with the status of their country in the international arena. Only 36% of respondents feel that the UK lacks the global status it deserves, the lowest percentage among the surveyed nations. This probably reflects the United Kingdom’s historical influence as an imperial power with global reach.
A greater role is strongly desired for the UN, NATO, the OSCE and the EU. This willingness to engage in cooperation is even stronger among British men and younger people. The effects of Brexit were evident in the 2021 survey, but there has been a gradual shift towards rapprochement, driven in part by Russia's war against Ukraine. The EU is increasingly seen as a key partner and perceptions of conflicts of interest are diminishing (2021: 54%, 2024: 46%). The US remains central to the UK's foreign policy in the eyes of respondents, emphasising the special relationship between the two nations. Nevertheless, if the US were to withdraw from European security, many Brits would favour closer alignment with Europe.
Strong opposition to Russia is evident, with 67% expressing reluctance towards cooperation. This sentiment is less pronounced among younger respondents. Opposition to China is less evident (50%), but has increased slightly in recent years. Under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, the United Kingdom has adopted a more cautious stance towards China, aligning with the EU’s de-risking approach.
Amidst uncertainties about the future and an unclear power balance, Britons foresee a new era of conflict, marked by a »my country first« mentality. Such an approach apparent during the Brexit period presents several challenges. Most respondents state that Brexit weakened UK alliances and the UK economy. Although 55% of respondents believe that the UK can follow an independent foreign policy, only 41% think the UK can react more nimbly to international challenges. However, most Britons reject the idea that the UK can be more easily pressured (41%).
Most respondents state that Brexit weakened UK alliances and the UK economy.
The perception of media reporting has improved. In 2021, the ratio of objective to non-objective reporting was 34% to 48%. By 2024, it had shifted to 45% to 35%, with young people increasingly perceiving media reporting as more objective.
A shift is observable in the UK’s defence strategy. Under the previous Conservative government’s »Global Britain« approach, the EU was largely shunned as a security partner. However, the Russian war against Ukraine has demonstrated the need for a closer UK–EU relationship. The Labour government advocates for a new security pact between the UK and the EU, including enhanced collaboration with Germany, France and Joint Expeditionary Force allies. The UK has also joined the EU’s military mobility project under PESCO.
73% agree on reducing UK dependency on countries with differing values.
Public opinion reflects this evolving stance: support for defence policy as a nation-state matter has decreased slightly to 50%, while approval for a European Army has risen to 43%. Leadership in European security is most entrusted to the trio of Germany, France and Poland. Russia is seen as the primary threat for Europe (82%), followed by 57% for China.
In the event of a Russian attack, only 34% believe the UK can properly defend itself. The EU is perceived as not too vulnerable: 42% agree and 39% disagree that the EU could defend itself even without US support. Maybe because of its so-called »special relationship« with the US, the UK shows comparatively low support for EU independence from the US (50%). NATO and EU enlargement towards the East are perceived as a threat by 43% and 41% of respondents, respectively.
The UK has long maintained a security partnership with Ukraine, providing NATO-standard training and military upgrades since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia is therefore seen as the clear aggressor. This reflects the willingness to push the boundaries in providing military aid, often ahead of other nations.
Support for Ukraine remains high at 67%, mainly through military aid (48%, thereof 60% men and 36% women), and for sending more weapons to Ukraine (49%). Younger respondents are more likely to favour economic and humanitarian aid. Support for sending troops is low, but ranks third highest in the poll at 22%. Approval for Ukraine joining the EU and NATO has notably risen, with a stable majority now for both memberships.
Despite this strong relationship and widespread approval of sanctions against Russia, there is no clear majority in the UK backing Ukraine until victory (42%), though the number is higher than the NATO average (32%). About a third prefer a diplomatic approach.
UK respondents perceive the war as being about territorial expansion (64%, 49% among those aged 18–29). Only a minority (16%) view it as a proxy war between Russia and the West, but men and people under 40 are twice as likely to choose this interpretation than women and older respondents. Russia is perceived to have been weakened by the war, while the other actors are rather seen as unaffected.
Looking ahead, the UK’s outlook is rather pessimistic, especially among women and increasing with age. A majority believe that global (54%) and European (39%) conditions will worsen in the next five years. Perceptions of the UK are more balanced, with 31% expecting a decline and 30% an improvement.
Given Britain’s imperial past, citizens support enhancing UK’s influence less than expected. For instance, while 60% of Britons support an active foreign policy, only 47% favour taking on greater international responsibility. The majority oppose promoting the country’s own values abroad, with stronger resistance among older generations. An overwhelming majority (73%) agree on reducing UK dependency on countries with conflicting values. The respondents’ top foreign policy priorities are combating terrorism and extremism (57%), followed by addressing climate change (44%) and resolving geopolitical tensions and conflicts (38%). Notably, concerns about geopolitical tensions and human rights violations have risen sharply since 2021.
Diplomacy is seen as the most effective and legitimate approach to resolving international crises. Support for international institutions is viewed as key to promoting global peace. As one of the five nuclear powers, the UK has a broad majority against the use of nuclear weapons, though it follows the US with the highest support for their use as a last resort (27%). Only about one-third of Britons favour military interventions in conflicts. Amid growing militarisation, it is noteworthy that 70% of the respondents still prefer to seek peace through diplomacy.
The UK has been a leader in international climate policy. While the Conservative government scaled back efforts, the incumbent Labour government aims to refocus on climate protection. Besides this, respondents are very satisfied with the policies in their country, particularly high among people under 30. A narrow majority believe that the UK needs to take all possible actions to combat climate change. The UK shows the third-greatest support for the view that international collaboration is key to addressing global climate challenges. The UK recognises its international responsibilities, with a majority supporting the protection of poorer countries.
Overall, 56% of respondents support higher military spending, though 60% prioritise economic and social expenditure. Support for funding the military includes a special levy on the rich (42%) or cuts to social and economic spending (24%). Surprisingly, younger people endorse budget cuts most (33% among those under 30). New borrowing is very unpopular (5%). The UK meets NATO's 2% defence spending target but has not significantly increased its budget despite strong support for Ukraine since 2022. Therefore, the Labour government has committed to raising defence spending to 2.5% of GDP, though it has not yet specified a timeline for this increase. However, reducing the UK's debt relative to its economy and securing additional resources for defence and foreign affairs will be difficult without tax hikes or spending cuts.
Britons are very satisfied with the climate policies in their country.
Security Radar 2025 is a representative public opinion poll conducted in September 2024 among the resident populations in 14 countries: Germany, France, Georgia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Türkiye, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States.
Public opinion may have a substantial impact on political decision-makers facing security issues, particularly at a time of high tensions and major uncertainty. The aim of the Security Radar Survey Series is to track changes in public opinion regarding issues relating to foreign-, security, and defense policy. Prior editions of the Security Radar Survey Series have been published in 2019, 2022, and 2023.
The focus of the Security Radar 2025 is to explore changes in public opinion since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To this end, we compare two surveys: The first is the Security Radar 2022, conducted in 14 countries prior to the outbreak of the war in autumn 2021, and published at the Munich Security Conference just days before the invasion. The second is the present Security Radar 2025, conducted three year later. This allows us to compare people’s attitudes directly before the invasion with attitudes almost three years into the war. For four EU members – France, Germany, Latvia and Poland – we have three data points to compare (as these four countries featured in the follow-up Security Radar 2023, which explored changes in public attitudes nine months into the war, in autumn 2022).
By »Europe« we understand the space covered by the members of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In certain obvious cases, however, we use »Europe« interchangeably with »the EU«. When we use the term »the West«, we mean the EU together with the USA. The pollster Ipsos Public Affairs in Berlin was assigned to carry out the fieldwork in twelve of the fourteen countries; in Georgia, the fieldwork was carried out by Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC). In Russia, the fieldwork was conducted by an independent pollster, whose name we decided not to disclose because of the risk of criminal liability. The survey is based on the Security Radar 2023 questionnaire, adapted and extended in line with developments related to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Overall, we explore and compare public opinion on the current security and foreign policy situation in Europe, focusing on seven aspects:
Conducting polls during wartime presents significant challenges, requiring cautious interpretation of the results. In Ukraine, ongoing hostilities in Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk regions prevented their inclusion in the sample, affecting the survey’s representativeness. The war has also altered Ukraine's demographics, with millions of people, particularly women, leaving the country and many men serving at the front.
Wartime conditions also increase the likelihood that people will provide what they perceive to be socially desirable responses, potentially skewing results. This may be especially the case in Russia, where repressive laws exacerbate this tendency. Despite these challenges, including Russia and Ukraine in the Security Radar survey remains crucial because of their significant roles in European security. The survey was last conducted in Russia and Ukraine in 2021, a few months before the full-scale invasion.
Data in Ukraine was gathered by Ipsos via online questionnaire. To gather data in Russia, an independent polling company was commissioned, although its identity is withheld to protect it from potential prosecution, given the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's »undesirable organisation« status in Russia. The poll was conducted via telephone, with a shortened questionnaire and some terms adapted to ensure respondents’ safety and from political considerations (for instance, the term »special military operation« was used instead of »Russia's war against Ukraine«).
These adaptations and precautions highlight the complexity of conducting polls in conflict zones and under restrictive regimes. While the data provides valuable insights, it's crucial to consider these limitations when interpreting the results, understanding that they offer a snapshot of public opinion under challenging circumstances rather than a comprehensive view.
Reichsratsstr. 13/5 A-1010 Vienna+43 (0) 1 890 3811 205peace.vienna(at)fes.de
Team & ContactSubscribe
Overview More
More
This site uses third-party website tracking technologies to provide and continually improve our services, and to display advertisements according to users' interests. I agree and may revoke or change my consent at any time with effect for the future.
These technologies are required to activate the core functionality of the website.
This is an self hosted web analytics platform.
Data Purposes
This list represents the purposes of the data collection and processing.
Technologies Used
Data Collected
This list represents all (personal) data that is collected by or through the use of this service.
Legal Basis
In the following the required legal basis for the processing of data is listed.
Retention Period
The retention period is the time span the collected data is saved for the processing purposes. The data needs to be deleted as soon as it is no longer needed for the stated processing purposes.
The data will be deleted as soon as they are no longer needed for the processing purposes.
These technologies enable us to analyse the use of the website in order to measure and improve performance.
This is a video player service.
Processing Company
Google Ireland Limited
Google Building Gordon House, 4 Barrow St, Dublin, D04 E5W5, Ireland
Location of Processing
European Union
Data Recipients
Data Protection Officer of Processing Company
Below you can find the email address of the data protection officer of the processing company.
https://support.google.com/policies/contact/general_privacy_form
Transfer to Third Countries
This service may forward the collected data to a different country. Please note that this service might transfer the data to a country without the required data protection standards. If the data is transferred to the USA, there is a risk that your data can be processed by US authorities, for control and surveillance measures, possibly without legal remedies. Below you can find a list of countries to which the data is being transferred. For more information regarding safeguards please refer to the website provider’s privacy policy or contact the website provider directly.
Worldwide
Click here to read the privacy policy of the data processor
https://policies.google.com/privacy?hl=en
Click here to opt out from this processor across all domains
https://safety.google/privacy/privacy-controls/
Click here to read the cookie policy of the data processor
https://policies.google.com/technologies/cookies?hl=en
Storage Information
Below you can see the longest potential duration for storage on a device, as set when using the cookie method of storage and if there are any other methods used.
This service uses different means of storing information on a user’s device as listed below.
This cookie stores your preferences and other information, in particular preferred language, how many search results you wish to be shown on your page, and whether or not you wish to have Google’s SafeSearch filter turned on.
This cookie measures your bandwidth to determine whether you get the new player interface or the old.
This cookie increments the views counter on the YouTube video.
This is set on pages with embedded YouTube video.
This is a service for displaying video content.
Vimeo LLC
555 West 18th Street, New York, New York 10011, United States of America
United States of America
Privacy(at)vimeo.com
https://vimeo.com/privacy
https://vimeo.com/cookie_policy
This cookie is used in conjunction with a video player. If the visitor is interrupted while viewing video content, the cookie remembers where to start the video when the visitor reloads the video.
An indicator of if the visitor has ever logged in.
Registers a unique ID that is used by Vimeo.
Saves the user's preferences when playing embedded videos from Vimeo.
Set after a user's first upload.
This is an integrated map service.
Gordon House, 4 Barrow St, Dublin 4, Ireland
https://support.google.com/policies/troubleshooter/7575787?hl=en
United States of America,Singapore,Taiwan,Chile
http://www.google.com/intl/de/policies/privacy/