Russia

Concerns about one’s personal future are pervasive in Russia (80%). Opinions on one’s personal economic situation are divided: 47% don’t expect a deterioration, while 46% do, with younger respondents expressing higher levels of concern. Although the Russian economy has proved remarkably adaptable and resilient in the face of the war and ensuing sanctions, the rouble has been tanking, making imports more expensive and putting a strain on Russia’s economy.

When it comes to Russia’s global standing, 54% of respondents believe it lacks the status it deserves globally, while 38% think it receives the status it merits, slightly above the poll average (32%). Half of Russians see their well-being linked to the prosperity of other countries, even amid the sanctions in response to the war against Ukraine, aimed at isolating Russia.

While the West in general is seen as an enemy, the US is seen as much more of an adversary than the EU.

Russian perspectives differ from others in the survey, but shared concerns persist. Russian respondents' views are therefore distinct, but not as much as might be assumed. 

Russian public opinion reveals a significant hostility towards a greater role for international organisations. The UN is viewed most positively with regard to taking on a larger role, with 51% approval, slightly higher than in Germany (48%) but below the global average. The OSCE follows closely with 48% support. Not surprising, a bigger role for NATO meets overwhelming disapproval (70%). 

Russian views on global power dynamics indicate their belief in the end of Western dominance. While the West in general is seen as an enemy, the US is seen as much more of an adversary than the EU. This is mirrored in perceptions of contradictory interests between Russia and the US (84%) and Russia and the EU (68%). Notably, both values have nearly doubled since the last survey in 2021, reflecting a new climate of confrontation.
The US remains the main adversary in the eyes of respondents. A majority believe that the era of American supremacy is over. Relatedly, cooperation with the US is anathema, rejected by almost 70%. 

Russians overwhelmingly cite the US (55%) as a threat to their country, followed a long way behind by the UK (10%). Ukraine and China are perceived as threats by only 4% of respondents, while NATO and the EU are mentioned by negligible percentages. About 1% mention ‘Russia is its own enemy’.

The EU retains a generally positive image, although opinion is divided. Interestingly, despite the EU's increasing distancing from Russia because of the war against Ukraine, identification with European culture in Russia has endured (69%, compared with 65% in 2021). While 77% see EU policies as conflicting with Russian interests, attitudes towards increased cooperation are mixed (48% opposed and 45% in favour). Russians don’t believe that the EU is becoming a global power, and a bigger role for it in the future is rejected (54%). However, Russians attribute military strength to the EU, as 68% believe the EU can defend itself without US support, more than double the average of polled European countries (32%). Here they follow the trend that the EU is perceived to be stronger by outside countries than by its own members.

In response to international sanctions, Russia has increasingly turned eastward. Russian respondents favour further collaboration with China, and almost 80% perceive Russian and Chinese interests as not contradictory.

Notably, nearly 70% of Russians see their country emerging as a new leader among non-Western countries, the highest percentage in the poll, coupled with a »my country first« approach. However, fewer Russians anticipate this compared with the poll average (45% vs 64%).

Russian perceptions of the war contrast sharply with international viewpoints. Only Serbians display similar attitudes. 

Russia annexed Crimea in violation of international law in 2014 and invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Russian disinformation and propaganda include attempts to discredit Ukraine. When asked about reasons for the war, respondents cite protection of Russian interests (37%), the fight against fascism (23%), and protection of the Russian-speaking population in the Donbas (21%). 

Some 73% of Russians blame the US for the war, well up from 51% in 2021. This aligns with Russian propaganda, which portrays the West as the aggressor. This is followed by almost the same shares for the EU (32%) and Ukraine (30%, although this has fallen substantially from 55% in 2021). However, only 22% attribute responsibility to Russia, in stark contrast to the Western perspective, although this figure rises to 44% among respondents under 30. Similarly, only slightly lower than their European peers, a majority (62%) believe that ending the war is crucial for improving European security.

44% among Russians under 30 attribute responsibility for the war against Ukraine to Russia.

As expected, a majority of Russians oppose Ukraine's membership of NATO or the EU, reflecting longstanding concerns. Only Serbians share this view, while all other polled nations take more favourable stances. 
Some 69% of Russians see NATO enlargement as a threat to European security, while 51% hold similar concerns about EU expansion. This highlights a consistent view: NATO (or the US), not the EU, is seen as the primary adversary.
Putin’s propaganda shapes public opinion in Russia, although Russian respondents share some perceptions with other polled nations, offering a glimpse of potential common ground. For example, concerns about nuclear escalation are widespread (65%). About 45% of Russians do not believe the war will end within the next 12 months, even higher than the poll average of 37%. Remarkably, even in Russia only 36% of respondents believe that Russia is going to prevail militarily. They also believe that the war will end with a diplomatic solution. 

Only 36% of respondents believe that Russia is going to prevail militarily. Majority believe in a diplomatic solution and support negotiations without preconditions. 

There is growing acceptance in Russia that it is time to start negotiations. Some 76% see it as unacceptable not to start negotiations at all. Over half (54%) would accept negotiations without preconditions. The most acceptable conditions for negotiations include Ukraine releasing all prisoners of war (89%) and ceasing hostilities (82%), and Ukraine’s recognition of Russia’s sovereignty over the annexed regions (73%). However, a majority find it unacceptable for Russia to withdraw all forces (63%). Opinions are mixed regarding internationally mediated negotiations (50% unacceptable, 41% acceptable), which is notable given Russia’s traditional resistance to external involvement in its security affairs. Nonetheless, this partial openness to diplomatic engagement could serve as a basis for future peace efforts. 

Looking ahead over the next five years, Russians remain optimistic about their own country (57%), a view that has risen significantly compared with 2021 (18%, up from 39%). They are notably more pessimistic about Europe, while their outlook on global developments is mixed (34% foresee deterioration, 33% improvement). 

Russian respondents display a pragmatic and interventionist stance. This is coupled with a focus on their well-being and a desire to avoid international involvements (56%). They show the highest support for cooperation with any country, even those that do not share their values, if they promote peace (78%). Approval for military interventions has risen from 37% in 2021 to 47%, but 45% remain opposed. 

Diplomatic negotiations are widely viewed as legitimate by an overwhelming majority (87%). Only 34% view economic sanctions and 29% military interventions as legitimate. The rejection of sanctions is expected, given the impact of the current sanctions regime on people’s everyday lives.

Putin's new doctrine has lowered the nuclear threshold, using threats and nuclear deployments to signal a readiness to escalate, and correspondingly, respondents' attitudes toward nuclear weapons are particularly concerning. While 67% reject their use, 16% consider them a last resort, and a notable 17% see them as a means of defending vital interests, the highest proportion in the poll.

Support for increasing military spending has surged, with 67% in favour, making it one of the highest rates in the poll, more than double the figure in 2021 (32%). However, respondents are nearly evenly split when asked to prioritise social and economic (45%) or defence spending (44%). This is a notable difference from Ukraine, where defence spending has the highest priority. A majority support funding defence through a special levy on the rich, while only 9% back cuts to social and economic spending, the lowest figure in the poll.

67% support increased military spending, more than double the figure in 2021.