Serbia

Serbs express significant concerns about their personal futures (72%). The biggest concerns are inflation (92%), wars and conflicts (2021: 77%, 2024: 86%) and economic crises (86%). Almost half of the population believe that their economic situation will deteriorate in the future.

A majority (63%) view Serbia’s prosperity as linked to the well-being of other countries. The overwhelming majority (76%) believe that Serbia does not have the international status it deserves. The strength of this sentiment remains among the highest in the poll and expresses deep-seated dissatisfaction.

There is a growing belief among Serbian respondents that the world is entering an era dominated by »my country first« policies (74%, above the overall average of 64%) and wars and conflicts (72%). 

Serbia has consistently expressed scepticism toward international organisations, which has intensified since the last survey. Nevertheless, 60% favour a greater role for the UN and 53% for the OSCE. The position towards the EU is divided, with 46% opposing a stronger role and 42% supporting it. NATO faces the strongest opposition, with 78% rejecting an expanded role. In March 1999, NATO bombed Yugoslavia to halt the bloodshed and the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority. This event was a defining moment in recent Serbian history and underpins a negative attitude towards NATO. Serbs are even more opposed to NATO today than they were in the years after the bombing campaign of 1999. This anti-NATO stance is reflected in the perception of NATO enlargement as a threat by 75%, by far the highest number in the poll, even surpassing Russia. Probably also connected to the bombing, Serbs largely reject the use of nuclear weapons (85%), while 14% accept them as a last resort. They also clearly reject military interventions.

75% perceive NATO enlargement as a threat, by far the highest number in the poll, even surpassing Russia.

Serbs seem to support a pragmatic stance and a multi-vector foreign policy. Collaboration with different players is desired across the board: 67% with China, 64% with Russia (the highest value in the poll) and 60% with the EU. In contrast, cooperation with the US (42%, dropping to 30% among those aged 18–29) is less welcome, and the majority disapprove (49%). Accordingly, Serbian respondents show the highest disapproval for economic decoupling (around 50% disapprove reducing dependence on Russia and China). Ties with Russia and China have indeed deepened since the fraudulent December 2023 elections, which brought President Aleksandar Vučić renewed victory. The Free Trade Agreement of 2023 strengthened relations with China, which are focused mainly on projects such as infrastructure investments and mining. 

Only 3% want to support Ukraine until it wins the war. 60% view it as a proxy war and 28% expect Russia to win.

Serbian respondents are overwhelmingly pro-Russian with regard to the Ukraine war.

Ukraine is blamed by 36% of respondents, the highest share in the poll, followed by the EU (30%) and the US (60%), only in Russia this value is higher. Only 26% consider Russia the aggressor, the lowest figure outside Russia itself (22%). Almost half, the highest share in the poll, think that it is not necessary to keep supporting Ukraine. The main reason people give is that »the war needs to end« (76%). A small share of 14% is in favour of supporting Ukraine, mainly focused on humanitarian aid. Serbs display the lowest support for helping Ukraine until it wins the war (a mere 3%, compared with the overall average of 30%). Instead, on a par with Italy, they are strong supporters of diplomatic efforts to end the war (49%). Together with Türkiye and Georgia, Serbia is also most amenable to a neutral stance (37%).

The country’s anti-NATO and anti-Western attitude is in line with Bel­grade’s pro-Russia policy. This resonates with Serbians. Russia’s actions in Ukraine are widely seen as defence of its own interests (41%), surpassing even perceptions within Russia (37%). Serbs are least likely to identify Russia as an imperialist state (4%). 

They strongly believe it to be a proxy war between Russia and the West, vying for global influence (60%). Regarding the war’s impact, 39% see Russia as strengthened. China is viewed as stronger (41%) or unaffected (38%), the EU as weakened (46%). Serbia is viewed as rather unaffected (56%). 

Serbia’s pro-Russia stance is highly visible in its rejection of Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership. While 40% believe diplomacy will end the war, 28% expect Russia to achieve military victory, by far the highest share in the entire poll (with the exception of Russia, where 36% believe Russia will prevail).

Serbs are cautiously optimistic about Serbia's future (36%) but notably pessimistic about Europe and the world, with majorities expecting deterioration. Notably, their outlook is more pessimistic than average, though the share of optimism increased slightly to 2021.

The optimism does not extend to EU accession, as Serbia has been negotiating with the EU since 2014. A majority (38%) believe the process is only an illusion and the EU does not want Serbia as a member. Some 26% still believe that it will happen, just the timing is uncertain. The unresolved Kosovo issue remains a significant obstacle, as the EU does not want to accept new members with unresolved territorial issues. 

However, 25 years after the Kosovo war, the majority (66%, thereof 70% men and 61% women) believe that Serbia should maintain its position on Kosovo. Only a mere 11% favour recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Remarkably, these perceptions are consistent across generations and haven’t changed over time.

Serbia’s foreign policy emphasises self-interest, with 86% focusing on domestic well-being and efforts to avoid international involvement. The desire for an active foreign policy is the second-lowest in the poll and has been decreasing (2021: 58%, 2024: 49%). Still, almost 60% want to promote values abroad.

Foreign policy priorities include combating terrorism and extremism (51%), addressing human rights violations (48%), and managing climate change (46%). Regarding climate change, respondents are largely dissatisfied with current policies. They strongly support the idea that rich countries should protect poor and vulnerable countries and that international collaboration is key. 

To promote peace, the respondents mention diplomatic efforts and international institutions. Overall, the perception of the effectiveness of all foreign policy means – diplomacy, military, sanctions – has decreased since 2021. 
Serbia has invested heavily in its military, becoming the Western Balkans' leading force. About half of respondents support more military spending, just like in 2021. A large majority (67%) favour social and economic investments over defence. As in most other polled countries, a majority support funding such investments through a special levy on the rich (61%). Savings in other budgets are rejected.