After declaring Türkiye an independent state Kemal Atatürk took the country in a more liberal direction. Secularism was adopted in 1928, and in 1950 Türkiye held its first free elections. Over the following decades, Türkiye aimed to strengthen international ties, joining NATO in 1952 and signing an association agreement with the European Economic Community in 1963. EU accession talks, ongoing since 2005, have stalled amid concerns over human rights abuses, restrictions on press freedom and democratic backsliding. EU membership now appears to be a very distant prospect.Since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to power in 2003, an economic rollercoaster ride, including boom periods as well as mismanagement and high inflation, has further unsettled the population. Türkiye has also been involved in international conflicts, such as those in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh. Under Erdoğan’s leadership, Türkiye has taken a more assertive stance in foreign policy, positioning itself as a key force within the region and the broader Muslim world.
After declaring Türkiye an independent state Kemal Atatürk took the country in a more liberal direction. Secularism was adopted in 1928, and in 1950 Türkiye held its first free elections. Over the following decades, Türkiye aimed to strengthen international ties, joining NATO in 1952 and signing an association agreement with the European Economic Community in 1963. EU accession talks, ongoing since 2005, have stalled amid concerns over human rights abuses, restrictions on press freedom and democratic backsliding. EU membership now appears to be a very distant prospect.
Since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to power in 2003, an economic rollercoaster ride, including boom periods as well as mismanagement and high inflation, has further unsettled the population. Türkiye has also been involved in international conflicts, such as those in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh. Under Erdoğan’s leadership, Türkiye has taken a more assertive stance in foreign policy, positioning itself as a key force within the region and the broader Muslim world.
Turkish respondents generally display strong opinions, often ranking among the most or the least supportive of particular statements in the poll. Turks are plagued by concerns, with a notable 85% expressing worries about their personal future. The biggest concerns of Turkish people are inflation (87%), economic crises (87%), and wars and conflicts (83%).
A staggering 80% of Turks feel that their nation does not have the status it deserves, the highest level of dissatisfaction of all the countries polled. This level of dissatisfaction has hardly changed since 2021. However, Turks feel rather independent and autonomous, as only 56% (the third-lowest score among the poll) are convinced that Türkiye’s prosperity is linked to the well-being of other countries.
Türkiye's foreign and security policy is characterised by a plurality of institutional alignments. A greater role is desired for international organisations such as the UN (67%), the EU (61%), NATO (56%) and the OSCE (54%).
80% of Turks feel that their nation does not have the status it deserves – the highest level in the poll, unchanged since 2021.
Türkiye’s geopolitical outlook is shaped by its complex relations with major powers. Opinions on greater cooperation with the US are almost evenly split at 44%. While 64% desire greater cooperation with the EU, almost the same share see a conflict of interests between the EU and Türkiye. In their view the relationship is unbalanced. A large majority (60%) perceive the EU as the primary beneficiary with only 22% seeing Türkiye in this role.
Similarly, Turks perceive their NATO membership as benefiting primarily NATO (51%) rather than Türkiye (30%). However, Türkiye holds a unique position within NATO given its peculiar relationship with Russia. It supplies the Ukrainian Army with weapons, but at the same time it is the only NATO member that does not implement sanctions against Russia. It has also not banned Russian aircraft from landing in Türkiye, having become a gateway for travel between Europe and Russia.
Türkiye seeks to broaden its partnerships beyond the West. With its application to join the BRICS, it could become the first country to be part of both alliances. Instead of adopting a de-risking strategy toward China, like many European countries, 64% of Turks favour stronger cooperation with Beijing. A majority (58%) favour closer relations with Russia, the third-highest share in the survey. Somewhat contradicting this, the same percentage (58%) would prefer reduced dependence on Russia and China, even if this has a negative impact on living standards.
Turkish respondents express significant distrust in media reporting. Only 25% view it as objective, while 67% perceive it as biased, the second-highest level of mistrust in the poll. However, the ratio has improved since 2021, when only 15% considered media reporting to be objective.
Turks see their country as a centre of gravity. More than in any other polled country, they believe that middle powers such as Türkiye, Brazil and South Africa are emerging as new centres of influence (57%). This aligns with President Erdoğan's call for a »Century of Türkiye«, which is also mirrored by strong agreement (83%) that the world is entering an era of »my country first«. But Turkish respondents acknowledge other centres of power, too. Unlike anywhere else, they see potential for the EU to achieve the status of a global player (56%) and for Russia to assume leadership of the countries outside the West (57%; only in Serbia do more people agree).
57% believe that middle powers such as Türkiye, Brazil and South Africa are emerging as new centres of influence.
The emergence of new powers is more likely to spark competition than to foster cooperation. Turks express significant concerns about the possibility of a new Cold War (68%) and a new world war (56%), higher than the polled average. Some 74% fear a direct impact from wars and conflicts in Türkiye.
Turkish perception of risks to Europe differs notably from other NATO countries. They show less agreement that ending the war against Ukraine is a prerequisite for peace in Europe. Notably, Russia and the US are seen equally as threats (55%), followed by China (44%). Turkish respondents strongly perceive risks in the conflicts of interests between great powers: the US and China, the US and Russia, and the EU and Russia.
Turkish perception differs from other NATO countries. Russia and the US are seen equally as threats.
A majority (73%) believe that the EU should focus on diplomacy rather than build up a European Army. Türkiye has the highest trust among the polled nations in Germany as a leader in European security (33%), even slightly more than the Germans themselves (30%). In contrast to Poland’s scepticism (28%), Turks trust Europe’s ability to defend itself without US support (64%). Almost 60% of Turks see their country as well prepared to defend itself in case Russia declared war.
64% of Turks trust Europe’s ability to defend itself without US support.
Türkiye’s stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine stands apart from other NATO countries. Some 42% view the war as a proxy war between the West and Russia, a sentiment shared only in countries outside the EU. Turks also view Russia’s invasion as driven by long-standing disagreements between Russia and Ukraine (30%), the highest value in the poll.
While 50% blame Russia for the war, a significant proportion holds the US (47%) and the EU (26%) to blame. Consistent with Türkiye's unique positioning, 47% of respondents endorse diplomatic efforts to end the war. Some 38% advocate for a neutral stance, the second-highest share in the poll. Accordingly, the majority (46%) advocate for humanitarian aid, while only 27% support military aid (among 18–29 year olds: 36%). This figure is significantly lower than the average of 48% among polled NATO countries. However, in line with other NATO partners, the majority of Turks oppose troop deployment (73%).
On other issues, Turks are rather divided. Amid tensions with the EU over Türkiye's refusal to join sanctions on Russia, 45% support sanctions and 39% oppose them. Similarly, there is no decisive majority in favour of Ukrainian membership of the EU (41% support, 35% oppose) and NATO (38% support, 39% oppose). During the last NATO enlargement, Türkiye notably blocked Sweden's membership for months. Among the 31% who believe that no further support should be provided to Ukraine, 65% believe that the war needs to end.
About half consider it most important to stop the war, even if it means that Ukraine loses control of some areas to Russia. This aligns with the survey results from 2021, when 60% of Turkish respondents agreed that borders have always changed as a result of wars. Still, the majority of Turks believe in a diplomatic resolution to the war.
Regarding the effects of the war, China (42%) and Russia (34%) are perceived to have been strengthened by it. In this context, Türkiye stands out once again, as other NATO countries perceive Russia as having been weakened. Next to Türkiye only Russia itself, Serbia and Kazakhstan think that Russia has become stronger.
51% oppose military intervention in conflicts, up from 37% in 2021.
The prevailing belief for developments over the next five years is rather bleak. Around 62% of Turks fear that the global situation will worsen, with those 18-29 years of age somewhat more optimistic. Reflecting the »Türkiye first« approach, a notable majority prioritise focusing on the country's own well-being. Accordingly, only about half support assuming more international responsibility and helping other states if there are no direct benefits to Türkiye. Nevertheless, over 70% support an active foreign policy.
Foreign policy priorities include combating terrorism and extremism (50%), addressing international migration (45%), and tackling human rights violations (41%). For conflict resolution, Turks see diplomatic efforts as most important (46%), as these are viewed as the most effective and legitimate means. Regarding current involvements, a majority (58%) prioritise focusing on the conflict in Gaza, while only 6% choose war against Ukraine. Only a quarter of Turks are satisfied with their country’s and the world’s climate policy efforts. Nearly 60% support taking all possible measures to address climate change. A broad majority support wealthier nations aiding poorer ones and emphasise international collaboration. However, if climate change leads to instability, around 71% favour border protection.
Support for interventionist foreign policy is rather declining, in contrast with the reality of assertive Turkish foreign policy. Turkish respondents tend towards restraint, with 51% opposing military intervention in conflicts, up from 37% in 2021. At the same time, belief in the effectiveness of military intervention as an instrument of foreign policy is by far the highest in the poll (64%), which appears contradictory. Almost 70% oppose the use of nuclear weapons, 23% consider them acceptable as a last resort.
A majority (67%) support increased military spending. Still, 60% prioritise social and economic spending over defence, though this figure is higher among those aged 18–39. Most respondents believe that higher military spending should be financed by a special levy on the rich (62%). This represents one of the highest levels of support among the surveyed countries and reflects Türkiye’s high inequality.
Security Radar 2025 is a representative public opinion poll conducted in September 2024 among the resident populations in 14 countries: Germany, France, Georgia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Türkiye, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States.
Public opinion may have a substantial impact on political decision-makers facing security issues, particularly at a time of high tensions and major uncertainty. The aim of the Security Radar Survey Series is to track changes in public opinion regarding issues relating to foreign-, security, and defense policy. Prior editions of the Security Radar Survey Series have been published in 2019, 2022, and 2023.
The focus of the Security Radar 2025 is to explore changes in public opinion since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To this end, we compare two surveys: The first is the Security Radar 2022, conducted in 14 countries prior to the outbreak of the war in autumn 2021, and published at the Munich Security Conference just days before the invasion. The second is the present Security Radar 2025, conducted three year later. This allows us to compare people’s attitudes directly before the invasion with attitudes almost three years into the war. For four EU members – France, Germany, Latvia and Poland – we have three data points to compare (as these four countries featured in the follow-up Security Radar 2023, which explored changes in public attitudes nine months into the war, in autumn 2022).
By »Europe« we understand the space covered by the members of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In certain obvious cases, however, we use »Europe« interchangeably with »the EU«. When we use the term »the West«, we mean the EU together with the USA. The pollster Ipsos Public Affairs in Berlin was assigned to carry out the fieldwork in twelve of the fourteen countries; in Georgia, the fieldwork was carried out by Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC). In Russia, the fieldwork was conducted by an independent pollster, whose name we decided not to disclose because of the risk of criminal liability. The survey is based on the Security Radar 2023 questionnaire, adapted and extended in line with developments related to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Overall, we explore and compare public opinion on the current security and foreign policy situation in Europe, focusing on seven aspects:
Conducting polls during wartime presents significant challenges, requiring cautious interpretation of the results. In Ukraine, ongoing hostilities in Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk regions prevented their inclusion in the sample, affecting the survey’s representativeness. The war has also altered Ukraine's demographics, with millions of people, particularly women, leaving the country and many men serving at the front.
Wartime conditions also increase the likelihood that people will provide what they perceive to be socially desirable responses, potentially skewing results. This may be especially the case in Russia, where repressive laws exacerbate this tendency. Despite these challenges, including Russia and Ukraine in the Security Radar survey remains crucial because of their significant roles in European security. The survey was last conducted in Russia and Ukraine in 2021, a few months before the full-scale invasion.
Data in Ukraine was gathered by Ipsos via online questionnaire. To gather data in Russia, an independent polling company was commissioned, although its identity is withheld to protect it from potential prosecution, given the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's »undesirable organisation« status in Russia. The poll was conducted via telephone, with a shortened questionnaire and some terms adapted to ensure respondents’ safety and from political considerations (for instance, the term »special military operation« was used instead of »Russia's war against Ukraine«).
These adaptations and precautions highlight the complexity of conducting polls in conflict zones and under restrictive regimes. While the data provides valuable insights, it's crucial to consider these limitations when interpreting the results, understanding that they offer a snapshot of public opinion under challenging circumstances rather than a comprehensive view.
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