Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has undergone a profound transformation. The 2004 Orange Revolution marked the first major uprising against entrenched political elites, while the 2013–2014 Euromaidan protests firmly aligned the country with the West, ushering in sweeping political, economic and social reforms. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea in violation of international law, and in 2022 it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since then, Ukraine, with support from the West, has been defending itself against the Russian onslaught. There is currently no prospect of a significant improvement.Ukraine has been a candidate for EU membership since June 2022. At the 2023 Vilnius Summit, NATO allies agreed to strengthen Ukraine’s defence sector, helping it transition to full interoperability with NATO.
Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has undergone a profound transformation. The 2004 Orange Revolution marked the first major uprising against entrenched political elites, while the 2013–2014 Euromaidan protests firmly aligned the country with the West, ushering in sweeping political, economic and social reforms. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea in violation of international law, and in 2022 it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since then, Ukraine, with support from the West, has been defending itself against the Russian onslaught. There is currently no prospect of a significant improvement.
Ukraine has been a candidate for EU membership since June 2022. At the 2023 Vilnius Summit, NATO allies agreed to strengthen Ukraine’s defence sector, helping it transition to full interoperability with NATO.
Ukrainians, grappling with the harsh realities of war, express the highest level of concern in the poll, up on the previous survey. Ukrainians’ primary concerns are wars and conflicts (overwhelmingly at 98%), inflation and the rising cost of living (95%), and economic crises (90%). Concerns about one’s personal future are utterly pervasive (over 90%), far exceeding the poll's 75% average. Economic concerns follow, with 63% worried, compared with the 49% survey average. While respondents in other countries largely feel secure in their immediate surroundings, Ukrainian opinion is evenly split: 48% (62% of those aged 18–29) feel safe, while 47% do not. Significant regional differences are evident. In areas close to the frontline, such as Kherson, 83% of people report feeling unsafe, as do 64% in Sumy. In Kyiv, the perception of insecurity stands at 52%, slightly above the national average.
Concerning the international stage, about 74% believe that Ukraine lacks the status it deserves, which ranks Ukrainians among the most dissatisfied with their standing. About 71% view their well-being as closely tied to that of other countries, up from 62% in 2021.
Ukrainians express the highest level of concern in the poll. The perception of insecurity is higher in areas close to the frontline, such as in Kherson and Sumy.
Ukrainians are the strongest supporters of an expanded role for international organisations in the survey, demonstrating their heightened reliance on international collaboration. They support an expanded role for the EU (79%), NATO (77%, significantly above the NATO members' average of 54%), the UN (70%) and the OSCE (63%).
About 90% of Ukrainians regard the end of the war as a fundamental prerequisite for improving security in Europe, highlighting the role of the country as a central focus of European security concerns. This interdependence is evident in the growing collaboration with Western powers and alliances. A significant majority of Ukrainians express a strong desire to join the EU (83%, up from 71% in 2021) and NATO (81%, well up from 62% in 2021). In line with their membership aspirations, Ukrainians do not view either NATO or EU expansion to the East as a threat.
The enthusiasm for closer ties is particularly pronounced regarding the EU: 86% of Ukrainians support closer cooperation. Opinions remain divided on whether the EU is emerging as a global power or whether its interests regularly conflict with those of Ukraine. Ukrainians demonstrate remarkable support for a European Army (75%, up from 56% in 2021). This level of support is significantly higher than the average among polled European countries (49%). It fits the perception of the EU’s current defensive capability, as 53% of Ukrainians believe that the EU is not able to defend itself without support from the US.
Regarding EU leadership in security policy, Ukrainians prefer a trio of Germany, France and Poland (32%), or Germany alone (19%).
Ukrainians under 30 are more likely to anticipate a new world war (45%) than the national average (36%).
About 63% believe that laws and rules are no longer relevant in international relations, on exactly the same level as in Russia and notably higher than the poll average (47%).
Around 50% of Ukrainians perceive media coverage as biased, but a considerable number (41%) view it as objective. It is unclear how much these attitudes are influenced by the »United News« television programme, which has been broadcasting since the war began, featuring government-endorsed content.
The US is another key partner, and 81% of Ukrainians express a desire for increased cooperation. They remain confident in the continuation of American supremacy (only 33% believe it is over). This aligns with the essential role of US support under President Biden in providing weapons and leading efforts to assist Kyiv.
As a result of the invasion, there is widespread opposition (85%) to any closer cooperation with Russia.
A significant 85% advocate reducing dependencies on Russia, even if it negatively impacts living standards. Unsurprisingly, 78% do not agree that Russia is taking a leadership role among non-Western nations. Russia is also viewed by 89% as the greatest threat to Europe, followed at some distance by China at 52%.
Attitudes toward China are mixed. Although China is one of Ukraine's largest trading partners, it is a key ally of Russia. Support for closer cooperation is waning, although 49% still favour closer cooperation (down from 69% in 2021). Over half back reducing dependence on China, even if it has a negative impact on living standards, while 31% oppose this.
Perceived divergences of interest are considered most pronounced between Russia and the US (76%) and the EU (73%). These levels are notably higher than those observed between China and the US (64%) and the EU (49%). Ties between the EU and the US, as well as between China and Russia are not perceived as contradictory.
The war shapes perceptions considerably. Ukrainian respondents believe that a new era of wars is emerging (72%), also marked by a »my country first« (64%) mentality. Ukrainians are uncertain about the likelihood of a new world war; 39% answered ‘don’t know’, while 36% lean toward ‘yes’ (respondents under 30: 45%). Above the survey average, 70% of Ukrainians believe that new wars in Europe are likely as a result of increasing tensions between Russia and the West and almost 60% see a direct military confrontation as probable.
In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, violating international law, and in February 2022, it escalated into a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At the time of the poll the Ukrainian military faced intense pressure in the east and southeast and Ukrainian forces had advanced into Russia's Kursk region to step up the pressure on Moscow.
An overwhelming 84% of Ukrainians hold Russia responsible for the war, followed by 26% who blame the US and 15% the EU. About 12% believe that their own country is responsible.
Considering the causes of the invasion, about half attribute it to Russia’s imperialistic ambitions, followed by 29% who point to Russia's desire to assert itself as a global power. Only 8% see longstanding disagreements as a factor. In the characterisation of the war, 53% believe the invasion is aimed at expanding Russia’s territory, in line with the respondents in most other polled countries, while 30% view it as a proxy war.
Not surprisingly, Ukrainians demonstrate the strongest support in the poll for continued defence assistance. Regarding their own position, 71% favour continuing aid until Ukraine wins the war, while 23% advocate diplomatic efforts to end the war. About 92% advocate further assistance. Asked about the means of support, Ukrainians predominantly favour military means (84%), ahead of economic and humanitarian aid. In a similar vein, an overwhelming majority back increased sanctions against Russia (90%, up dramatically from 67% in 2021), as well as weapons supplies (90%).
In line with President Zelensky’s calls for international support and troop deployments, only a very small proportion of respondents (14%) oppose third-country intervention. About 66% of respondents fear nuclear escalation, fuelled by Russia’s threatening rhetoric.
Ukrainians’ determination is evident in their stance on ending the war, as almost 40% prioritise ensuring a Russian loss, even at the risk of escalation (the highest proportion in the poll). However, just 23%, albeit still the highest proportion in the survey, believe Ukraine will prevail militarily. In sharp contrast, just 3% think that Russia will prevail militarily, a figure that is significantly lower than the NATO average of 11% and markedly below the 38% of Russians. About 30% are willing to accept territorial losses to end the war (lower than the NATO average of 44%); and 21% support restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity, even if it prolongs the war. However, 35% don’t believe that the war is going to end soon, while 30% foresee a diplomatic solution.
30% are willing to accept territorial losses to end the war, lower than the NATO average.
The continued desire for a Russian defeat is coupled with a growing acceptance of negotiations, as majorities accept starting them even without preconditions (57%) and oppose the notion of no negotiations at all (56%). Nearly all proposed conditions for negotiations receive strong support, with approval rates of over 90%, including if Russia ceases hostilities and attacks on critical infrastructure, and releases prisoners of war. Similarly high approval is seen for conditions such as Russia recognising Ukraine's sovereignty or withdrawing all occupying forces. The condition of Russia changing its political leadership receives comparatively lower support, although still large, with 77% in favour. There is also a mixed response toward international mediation versus direct negotiations, with 43% in favour of mediation and 24% opposed.
57% support negotiations without preconditions and 56% oppose the notion of no negotiations at all.
The openness to negotiations is tied to firm expectations regarding the conditions under which an end to the war is acceptable. Over 80% approve the conditions that Russia withdraws from all territories occupied since 2014, agrees never to strike Ukrainian land again and contributes substantially to the reconstruction of Ukraine, as well as that Kyiv receives credible security guarantees from the West. Unacceptable conditions include a reduction of Ukraine's military capabilities (rejected by 78%), or halting hostilities at the current frontline (by 71%). The following conditions are widely rejected: Ukraine refraining from reclaiming the four occupied oblasts (73% oppose), Russia withdrawing from all territories except Crimea (64% oppose), or withdrawing only from those occupied since 2022 (61% oppose). These opinions are even more pronounced among younger people. Opinions on Russia receiving security guarantees from the West are split, with 39% of Ukrainians opposing and 34% supporting.
60% of Ukrainians believe that their country will emerge stronger as a result of the war.
Despite ongoing losses of terrain on Ukrainian territory over the past 12 months, 60% of Ukrainians believe that their country will emerge stronger as a result of the war. Only Russians perceive their country as even stronger (62%), while 56% of Ukrainians view Russia as weaker.
A growing sense of hope is becoming apparent in response to the war. Some 66% express optimism about the future of their country, 52% for Europe and 46% for the world. Notably, younger generations are even more optimistic. Among the global security problems that should be given priority, Ukrainians name terrorism (58%), closely followed by geopolitical tensions (53%, the highest value in the poll and a 12% increase since 2021). Human rights violations rank third (46%).
Military interventions are still rather opposed (52%), but the position has weakened (in 2021 63% were against). Russia’s repeated threats of using nuclear weapons are met with strong opposition in Ukraine, with 88% rejecting their use. Ukrainians are the most ambitious with regard to pursuing an active foreign policy (79%, the highest value in the poll). However, this seems to have the clear purpose of serving national interests as their stance on taking on international responsibility even if there are no direct benefits is more divided, with 43% in favour and 40% opposed. A strong majority of Ukrainians (82%) support reducing dependencies on countries that do not share their values. Nonetheless, 65% are willing to cooperate with any country, even those that do not share their values, if it promotes peace and security in the world.
Diplomatic negotiations are viewed as the most effective and legitimate foreign policy tool. While military interventions and economic sanctions are seen as similarly effective, economic sanctions are considered legitimate by twice as many people (75% vs 36%). To promote international peace, the most favoured approach is the improvement of defence capabilities (65%, the highest value in the poll), followed by intensification of diplomatic efforts (40%).
65% of Ukrainians advocate strengthening defence capabilities as a means to promote international peace.
Ukrainian respondents express general dissatisfaction with the current policies of their country and the international community on climate change. While 44% favour taking all possible actions to combat climate change, 40% would prefer a focus on adaptation. The vast majority see climate change as a challenge to global peace and security and prioritise border security and international cooperation on climate change. About 78% support the idea that rich countries should protect poor and vulnerable countries from the impacts of climate change.
As a country at war, perhaps unsurprisingly they show the highest support among the polled countries (77%) for increased military spending. This is evident in the fact that 61% prioritise defence spending over economic and social expenditures (20%), in contrast to the Russian side, where opinion is almost evenly split. A majority support funding defence through a special levy on the rich, while only 15% back cuts to social and economic spending.
Security Radar 2025 is a representative public opinion poll conducted in September 2024 among the resident populations in 14 countries: Germany, France, Georgia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Türkiye, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States.
Public opinion may have a substantial impact on political decision-makers facing security issues, particularly at a time of high tensions and major uncertainty. The aim of the Security Radar Survey Series is to track changes in public opinion regarding issues relating to foreign-, security, and defense policy. Prior editions of the Security Radar Survey Series have been published in 2019, 2022, and 2023.
The focus of the Security Radar 2025 is to explore changes in public opinion since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To this end, we compare two surveys: The first is the Security Radar 2022, conducted in 14 countries prior to the outbreak of the war in autumn 2021, and published at the Munich Security Conference just days before the invasion. The second is the present Security Radar 2025, conducted three year later. This allows us to compare people’s attitudes directly before the invasion with attitudes almost three years into the war. For four EU members – France, Germany, Latvia and Poland – we have three data points to compare (as these four countries featured in the follow-up Security Radar 2023, which explored changes in public attitudes nine months into the war, in autumn 2022).
By »Europe« we understand the space covered by the members of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In certain obvious cases, however, we use »Europe« interchangeably with »the EU«. When we use the term »the West«, we mean the EU together with the USA. The pollster Ipsos Public Affairs in Berlin was assigned to carry out the fieldwork in twelve of the fourteen countries; in Georgia, the fieldwork was carried out by Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC). In Russia, the fieldwork was conducted by an independent pollster, whose name we decided not to disclose because of the risk of criminal liability. The survey is based on the Security Radar 2023 questionnaire, adapted and extended in line with developments related to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Overall, we explore and compare public opinion on the current security and foreign policy situation in Europe, focusing on seven aspects:
Conducting polls during wartime presents significant challenges, requiring cautious interpretation of the results. In Ukraine, ongoing hostilities in Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk regions prevented their inclusion in the sample, affecting the survey’s representativeness. The war has also altered Ukraine's demographics, with millions of people, particularly women, leaving the country and many men serving at the front.
Wartime conditions also increase the likelihood that people will provide what they perceive to be socially desirable responses, potentially skewing results. This may be especially the case in Russia, where repressive laws exacerbate this tendency. Despite these challenges, including Russia and Ukraine in the Security Radar survey remains crucial because of their significant roles in European security. The survey was last conducted in Russia and Ukraine in 2021, a few months before the full-scale invasion.
Data in Ukraine was gathered by Ipsos via online questionnaire. To gather data in Russia, an independent polling company was commissioned, although its identity is withheld to protect it from potential prosecution, given the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's »undesirable organisation« status in Russia. The poll was conducted via telephone, with a shortened questionnaire and some terms adapted to ensure respondents’ safety and from political considerations (for instance, the term »special military operation« was used instead of »Russia's war against Ukraine«).
These adaptations and precautions highlight the complexity of conducting polls in conflict zones and under restrictive regimes. While the data provides valuable insights, it's crucial to consider these limitations when interpreting the results, understanding that they offer a snapshot of public opinion under challenging circumstances rather than a comprehensive view.
Reichsratsstr. 13/5 A-1010 Vienna+43 (0) 1 890 3811 205peace.vienna(at)fes.de
Team & ContactSubscribe
Overview More
More
This site uses third-party website tracking technologies to provide and continually improve our services, and to display advertisements according to users' interests. I agree and may revoke or change my consent at any time with effect for the future.
These technologies are required to activate the core functionality of the website.
This is an self hosted web analytics platform.
Data Purposes
This list represents the purposes of the data collection and processing.
Technologies Used
Data Collected
This list represents all (personal) data that is collected by or through the use of this service.
Legal Basis
In the following the required legal basis for the processing of data is listed.
Retention Period
The retention period is the time span the collected data is saved for the processing purposes. The data needs to be deleted as soon as it is no longer needed for the stated processing purposes.
The data will be deleted as soon as they are no longer needed for the processing purposes.
These technologies enable us to analyse the use of the website in order to measure and improve performance.
This is a video player service.
Processing Company
Google Ireland Limited
Google Building Gordon House, 4 Barrow St, Dublin, D04 E5W5, Ireland
Location of Processing
European Union
Data Recipients
Data Protection Officer of Processing Company
Below you can find the email address of the data protection officer of the processing company.
https://support.google.com/policies/contact/general_privacy_form
Transfer to Third Countries
This service may forward the collected data to a different country. Please note that this service might transfer the data to a country without the required data protection standards. If the data is transferred to the USA, there is a risk that your data can be processed by US authorities, for control and surveillance measures, possibly without legal remedies. Below you can find a list of countries to which the data is being transferred. For more information regarding safeguards please refer to the website provider’s privacy policy or contact the website provider directly.
Worldwide
Click here to read the privacy policy of the data processor
https://policies.google.com/privacy?hl=en
Click here to opt out from this processor across all domains
https://safety.google/privacy/privacy-controls/
Click here to read the cookie policy of the data processor
https://policies.google.com/technologies/cookies?hl=en
Storage Information
Below you can see the longest potential duration for storage on a device, as set when using the cookie method of storage and if there are any other methods used.
This service uses different means of storing information on a user’s device as listed below.
This cookie stores your preferences and other information, in particular preferred language, how many search results you wish to be shown on your page, and whether or not you wish to have Google’s SafeSearch filter turned on.
This cookie measures your bandwidth to determine whether you get the new player interface or the old.
This cookie increments the views counter on the YouTube video.
This is set on pages with embedded YouTube video.
This is a service for displaying video content.
Vimeo LLC
555 West 18th Street, New York, New York 10011, United States of America
United States of America
Privacy(at)vimeo.com
https://vimeo.com/privacy
https://vimeo.com/cookie_policy
This cookie is used in conjunction with a video player. If the visitor is interrupted while viewing video content, the cookie remembers where to start the video when the visitor reloads the video.
An indicator of if the visitor has ever logged in.
Registers a unique ID that is used by Vimeo.
Saves the user's preferences when playing embedded videos from Vimeo.
Set after a user's first upload.
This is an integrated map service.
Gordon House, 4 Barrow St, Dublin 4, Ireland
https://support.google.com/policies/troubleshooter/7575787?hl=en
United States of America,Singapore,Taiwan,Chile
http://www.google.com/intl/de/policies/privacy/