Italy

A majority of 69% are concerned about their future. Italians’ biggest concerns are wars and conflicts, inflation and economic crises (over 80%). Uncontrolled migration (with 63%) ranks low, despite Meloni's pivotal role in shaping Europe's migration agenda.

Italy’s status dissatisfaction (63%) has improved slightly since the survey in 2021 (68%). But it still remains among the EU's highest, alongside Poland. Only 34% believe that the current government has improved Italy’s international reputation. Some 64% view Italy’s prosperity as linked to the well-being of other countries, similar to other polled EU countries.

Italy's rightward shift has led to an ambivalent strategy: pragmatic and opportunistic. Despite Meloni’s Eurosceptic roots, she balances nationalist priorities with increased influence in European decision-making. 

Italians reveal mixed sentiments about the EU's role and Italy's position within it. Italian respondents are least likely to believe that the EU will emerge as a major global power (33%). However, regarding Italy's current role and future course of action in the EU, 40% believe it is Italy's duty to strengthen European institutions, the highest value among polled countries (Poland, France and Germany). Additionally, 33% support a stronger EU leadership role, second only to Poland. Only 14% favour less EU engagement, lower than Germany (28%) and France (27%). At the same time, Italian public opinion shows growing ambivalence. Although the EU is the most valued organisation (63%), support for deeper cooperation has declined, and concerns over internal conflicts have risen (67%, above the EU average). Italians remain committed to European integration but are wary of the EU's cohesion and global influence. 

Italians show commitment to international institutions, as support for the OSCE has risen to 52%, reflecting a desire for peace. Italians are divided on NATO, with 43% opposing a bigger role, particularly among older generations, and 39% favouring it. Support for cooperating with Russia dropped from 45% in 2021 to 26%, and for the US from 54% to 43%, and remained stable in relation to China. 
Italy demonstrates a strong sense of pragmatism, adapting to benefit itself while avoiding taking sides. 

Nearly half disagree that the EU and the US have contradictory interests. Italians perceive a notable contradiction with regard to US–Russia relations (59%). Italy has one of the lowest perceptions of EU-Russia contradictions (50%) and the highest support among EU countries (64%) for cooperation with non-like-minded countries if it promotes peace and security. Some 61% support less dependence on Russia, 53% on China.

Media reporting is seen as lacking objectivity (54%); only 29% consider it objective. Nevertheless, concerns over press freedom have risen due to government control plans.

Italians advocate for peace and have a relatively subdued perception of threats. Italians foresee an emerging era of wars and conflicts but they do not appear to be too worried by recent events, as a new world war or a direct military confrontation between Russia and the West is not widely perceived as likely.

Russia is identified as the greatest threat for Europe, with concerns rising sharply from 36% in 2021 to 67% in 2024. Unlike in other NATO countries, concerns about the US as a threat have grown from 21% to 35%. This places the US nearly on a par with China (37%).

Changes in the security situation are regarded with scepticism. NATO enlargement is seen as a major threat by 52%, higher than in other NATO countries, while 45% express concerns about EU enlargement towards the East. 

Only about a third believe Italy should increase support for the EU-accession of Western Balkans countries.

Only a third see defence as an EU responsibility, and approval for a European Army ranks at 42%, a low figure compared with other EU members. Only 17% favour military interventions. Half believe the EU can't defend itself without the US. Some 57% doubt Italy's ability to defend against a Russian attack, below the European average. As a leader in EU security, most respondents favour Germany (21%) or joint leadership by Germany, France and Poland (14%). Over two-thirds of Italians desire ensuring international peace through other means, such as diplomacy, an expression of multilateralism.
 

Only 18% of Italians back supporting Ukraine until it wins the war – in contrast to 50% in Latvia or Sweden.

Italy’s defensive, peace-oriented approach contrasts with the more assertive stances of Sweden and Poland. Under Meloni, Italy supports NATO and EU measures against Russia but is among the least enthusiastic EU supporters of Ukraine.

Over 70% see an end to the war as a precondition for peace in Europe and express concern that it will impact Italy’s future. Only 64% hold Russia accountable, lower than most EU countries, and nearly half see the war as expanding Russian territory, below EU and NATO averages.

Some 68% of opponents of increasing Ukraine’s support believe that ending the war is crucial. Only 18% back supporting Ukraine until it wins the war, by far the lowest value of all EU countries (in Sweden and Latvia: around 50%). A notable 19% of Italians, double the rate in Sweden or Poland, believe Russia might prevail on the battlefield. War fatigue, particularly among older generations, contributes to a willingness to consider territorial concessions for peace. Additionally, 53% of Italians believe the EU is shifting its focus away from challenges in the southern neighbourhood. 

Regarding Italy’s position on the war against Ukraine, 49% favour diplomatic efforts to end the war, 25% support neutrality. Just over half support more sanctions. Italians are more sceptical than other EU nations about Ukraine joining the EU (42% in favour) and NATO (35% in favour). Only 42% of Italians support further aid to Ukraine, while 34% oppose it. Unlike the trends towards strengthening the military in most NATO countries, half of Italians favour humanitarian aid, followed by military support. Accordingly, 42% oppose third-country intervention.

The EU is most affected by the war, with 37% of Italians perceiving it as unchanged and 36% as weaker. Some 26% believe Russia has gained in strength. Italy is seen as unchanged by 45%.

Italians expect worsening developments over the next five years, maintaining a bleak outlook since 2021. 

The Italian foreign policy outlook is not monolithic, though, and has some contradictions. The defensive stance described above sits alongside strong endorsement of an active foreign policy and support for spreading values through foreign policy (57%). This may reflect Meloni’s assertive stance geared towards boosting Italy’s visibility. Nearly 70% of respondents support reducing dependency on countries with different values, similar to EU peers. This contradicts Italian pragmatic stance regarding cooperation with non-like-minded states, mentioned earlier. 

Italians’ top foreign policy priorities remain climate change, with a significant rise in support for human rights and geopolitical tensions since the last survey. About half support stronger diplomacy and 37% back global disarmament efforts, the highest share in the poll, and an increase in opposition to military interventions. Confidence in the effectiveness and legitimacy of diplomatic, military and economic measures has declined. This reflects disenchantment with regard to foreign policy, which is unlikely to achieve desired peace scenarios. Unsurprisingly, diplomacy receives the highest approval, particularly from older people. Opposition to military interventions in conflicts increased and is the highest in the poll (74%).

At 26% Italians show by far the lowest support for increasing military spending, 72% prioritise social spending over defence. 

Italians are very aware of the risks that climate change poses, even though only 45% of Italians see climate change as a threat to peace, substantially lower than the average. Some 62% favour doing everything to fight climate change, the highest share in the poll. Most Italians are dissatisfied with climate action, with the EU efforts regarded as the most satisfying (23%). Italian respondents show an overall decline in support for cooperation, but 74% see international partnerships as key to combating climate change. A majority also believe that wealthy nations should support poorer ones.

Amid broader trends of rising defence budgets across NATO, Italy has taken a divergent path. Italy has the lowest support for increased military spending among NATO countries, at 26%, well below the 57% average. Resistance to higher defence budgets reflects longstanding Italian attitudes, rather than war fatigue, as the support level in 2021 was nearly identical at 24%. Defence spending has steadily declined, dropping from 1.59% of GDP in 2020 to 1.46% in 2023, with further reductions projected. Italians overwhelmingly favour prioritising social and economic spending over defence (72%), the highest rate in the survey. As a result, if military spending rises, 52% favour a special levy on the rich.