Sweden, a parliamentary monarchy in Northern Europe, has a rich history, marked by its commitment to neutrality and diplomacy. Shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, Sweden abandoned its 200-year-long policy of neutrality and non-alignment and applied for NATO membership. This shift resulted in a significant change in Sweden's defence policy and to its admission as NATO’s latest member in 2024. As an EU member since 1995, Sweden has emphasised human rights and sustainability on the global stage. The conservative Kristersson government, formed in 2022 with support from the right-wing Sweden Democrats, reflects a changing political landscape and has adopted stricter immigration policies, raising concerns about Sweden’s commitment to climate protection and value-based foreign policy.
Sweden, a parliamentary monarchy in Northern Europe, has a rich history, marked by its commitment to neutrality and diplomacy. Shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, Sweden abandoned its 200-year-long policy of neutrality and non-alignment and applied for NATO membership. This shift resulted in a significant change in Sweden's defence policy and to its admission as NATO’s latest member in 2024.
As an EU member since 1995, Sweden has emphasised human rights and sustainability on the global stage. The conservative Kristersson government, formed in 2022 with support from the right-wing Sweden Democrats, reflects a changing political landscape and has adopted stricter immigration policies, raising concerns about Sweden’s commitment to climate protection and value-based foreign policy.
Swedes appear to be among the least worried respondents in the poll. Their main concerns pertain to inflation (74%), wars and conflicts (74%), and international terrorism (69%). This sense of security reflects Swedes' strong support for international engagement and their lower prioritisation of national interests. Despite abandoning its feminist foreign policy, its potential reintroduction enjoys majority support only among those under 30. The principle of reducing Sweden’s dependence on countries that do not share similar values continues to have widespread support, especially among older respondents.
Despite Sweden's wealth, 74% of people express concerns about their personal future. Nearly half fear a decline in their economic situation, which is on a par with less affluent countries. Swedes show general satisfaction with the country's current standing in the global community. Only 44% of respondents perceive a lack of international status, one of the lowest figures in the poll.
country first« mentality. Despite these concerns, Sweden ranks the lowest overall with regard to fears of war. The perception that future conflicts will impact the country are the third lowest in the poll and the lowest among NATO and EU members. Half of the respondents expressed concerns about a direct military confrontation between Russia and the West. This suggests that while Swedes recognise global instability, they are comparatively less anxious about direct consequences for their nation.
Sweden ranks the lowest with regard to fears of war. While Swedes recognise global instability, they are less anxious about direct consequences for their nation.
The prevailing belief, as in Germany and France, is that American supremacy is rather over. A strong respect for international laws and norms persists, underscoring their commitment to a rules-based global order.
Some 62% of Swedes support greater cooperation with the EU. Swedes see the third lowest rate of conflict of interests between their country and the EU (35%), with women even less conflict-sensitive (28%) than men (43%). Also, half prefer greater cooperation with the US. Only 22% favour increased collaboration with China, the lowest rate in the poll. Second only to Ukraine, a mere 13% favour more cooperation with Russia, showing a notable gender gap, with 19% of men versus 7% of women in favour. That means that 74% want to reduce dependency on Russia, and 64% on China. When asked about contradictory interests between different players, the discord between the EU and Russia is viewed as greatest, followed by the United States and Russia. The EU and the United States, as well as China and Russia, are not perceived to have conflicting interests and rather as aligning (both at 43%).
Swedish perceptions of media reliability on foreign and security policy are rather positive. Next to Germany and Russia, Swedes put most trust in media reporting (51%).
Only 22% favour increased collaboration with China, the lowest rate in the poll.
Sweden's integration into NATO has been accelerated by the invasion of Ukraine, strengthening the perception of Russia as the primary security threat for Europe (84%), the second-highest figure in the poll. This is well above concerns regarding China (59%) and the US (34%). NATO expansion is seen as a security threat by 46%, on average with other polled NATO countries, while 38% disagree. Similarly, 42% view EU enlargement as a risk, with 36% opposing. The United States is viewed as posing the lowest security threat.
Sweden seeks to enhance its security in partnership with allies, as a significant portion of Swedes (66%) doubt their own defence capabilities in the event of a Russian attack. But even though Swedes regard themselves as vulnerable, nearly 47% still regard national defence as a domestic responsibility. The EU's defence capability without US support receives the highest confidence rating among EU member states, at 38%. At any case, a majority of respondents (54%) express support for reducing dependence on the US.
Reflecting Sweden’s historically neutral policy, the large majority favour maintaining peace through non-military means. Around 45% are in favour of establishing an EU Army, notably lower than in France (56%) or Poland (54%). When asked about EU security leadership, a combined Germany, France and Poland or a solo German leadership is preferred (21%), although nearly a third answered 'don't know'.
Swedes rank third in the poll for trust in media reporting.
17% prioritise Russia losing the war against Ukraine, even at the risk of escalation.
Sweden is aligned with countries that emphasise a proactive and robust approach to security, prioritising strong defence policies and strategic deterrence in addressing potential threats. A majority, as in other polled countries, view ending the war against Ukraine as key to improving European security. The war itself is seen by 66% as territorial expansion and Russia as the major aggressor.
Swedish respondents take a strong position. Half of respondents advocate for continued support until victory. Another 26% favour further diplomatic efforts. Meanwhile, 17% – the second-highest value among NATO countries – agree that the top priority is to ensure that Russia loses the war, even with the risk of escalation. In line with this, support for Ukraine is desired mainly through military (49%), rather than humanitarian (23%) or economic (20%) means. Sweden is, just behind Poland, the second-strongest supporter in the EU of expanding sanctions against Russia (67%).
Concerning the effects of the war, Sweden expresses cautious optimism about a stronger role for NATO and the EU. Similar to most strong supporters of Ukraine, Russia is widely perceived as having been weakened by the war, indicating a decline in its influence.
Thinking about the next five years, the outlook is rather bleak, with anticipated adverse developments for peace and security globally (58%), in Europe (45%), and in Sweden (34%). Swedes now support an active and assertive stance, but the concept of neutrality still garners support. Half of the respondents seem to endorse greater international responsibility, even with no direct benefits (49%). Some 62% plead for an active foreign policy and diplomatic negotiations are perceived as the most effective means of pursuing foreign policy. To maintain international peace, Sweden continues to prioritise the strengthening of international institutions, their commitment to multilateralism and dedicated diplomatic efforts. Swedes show the highest approval for enhancing these institutions among respondents. Over two-thirds support the idea of expanding cooperation with the Baltic and Nordic partners.
Swedes support a combination of assertiveness and neutrality.
The foreign policy priority is combating terrorism and extremism (66%, the highest value in the poll). This could be linked to the debate on NATO accession, as Sweden's agreement with Türkiye is linked to the »fight against terrorism«, driven by Erdoğan's concerns over Sweden's alleged support for Kurdish groups deemed threats to Türkiye’s security. Another priority is to address human rights violations (50%), while this percentage is even higher (59%) among those aged 18-29, and women are more concerned than men. Climate change is in the top three (42%) and still almost half advocate taking every possible measure to combat it.
Sweden is widely recognised as a key advocate of multilateralism and collaborative efforts to address global challenges, to strengthen its national resilience to ensure preparedness for various crises. While only a third of respondents express satisfaction with the Swedish government's climate policy, this figure is among the highest for national climate policies, alongside the UK, Kazakhstan and the US Sweden’s traditional role is reflected in the fact that 71% of respondents support greater international collaboration, while prioritising domestic borders during instability receives the lowest approval in the poll. Furthermore, 64% of respondents express support for poorer countries.
As Sweden navigates the new geopolitical landscape, there is almost an equal split between adopting all NATO foreign policy directives (34%) and maintaining neutrality for its intrinsic benefits (35%). Moreover, there are some uncertainties regarding its military stance. Opinions are divided, with 44% supporting military intervention and 50% advocating a stance of non-involvement. In any case, Swedes express a clear rejection of the use of nuclear weapons (79%). Military spending has increased since 2018 and is supposed to reach almost double that of 2023 by 2030. Meanwhile, in line with the average for all countries included in the poll, over half of respondents prefer increased investment in social and economic programmes to military expenditure. If military spending is deemed necessary, however, 44% would prefer a special levy on the rich to fund it.
Security Radar 2025 is a representative public opinion poll conducted in September 2024 among the resident populations in 14 countries: Germany, France, Georgia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Türkiye, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States.
Public opinion may have a substantial impact on political decision-makers facing security issues, particularly at a time of high tensions and major uncertainty. The aim of the Security Radar Survey Series is to track changes in public opinion regarding issues relating to foreign-, security, and defense policy. Prior editions of the Security Radar Survey Series have been published in 2019, 2022, and 2023.
The focus of the Security Radar 2025 is to explore changes in public opinion since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To this end, we compare two surveys: The first is the Security Radar 2022, conducted in 14 countries prior to the outbreak of the war in autumn 2021, and published at the Munich Security Conference just days before the invasion. The second is the present Security Radar 2025, conducted three year later. This allows us to compare people’s attitudes directly before the invasion with attitudes almost three years into the war. For four EU members – France, Germany, Latvia and Poland – we have three data points to compare (as these four countries featured in the follow-up Security Radar 2023, which explored changes in public attitudes nine months into the war, in autumn 2022).
By »Europe« we understand the space covered by the members of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In certain obvious cases, however, we use »Europe« interchangeably with »the EU«. When we use the term »the West«, we mean the EU together with the USA. The pollster Ipsos Public Affairs in Berlin was assigned to carry out the fieldwork in twelve of the fourteen countries; in Georgia, the fieldwork was carried out by Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC). In Russia, the fieldwork was conducted by an independent pollster, whose name we decided not to disclose because of the risk of criminal liability. The survey is based on the Security Radar 2023 questionnaire, adapted and extended in line with developments related to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Overall, we explore and compare public opinion on the current security and foreign policy situation in Europe, focusing on seven aspects:
Conducting polls during wartime presents significant challenges, requiring cautious interpretation of the results. In Ukraine, ongoing hostilities in Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk regions prevented their inclusion in the sample, affecting the survey’s representativeness. The war has also altered Ukraine's demographics, with millions of people, particularly women, leaving the country and many men serving at the front.
Wartime conditions also increase the likelihood that people will provide what they perceive to be socially desirable responses, potentially skewing results. This may be especially the case in Russia, where repressive laws exacerbate this tendency. Despite these challenges, including Russia and Ukraine in the Security Radar survey remains crucial because of their significant roles in European security. The survey was last conducted in Russia and Ukraine in 2021, a few months before the full-scale invasion.
Data in Ukraine was gathered by Ipsos via online questionnaire. To gather data in Russia, an independent polling company was commissioned, although its identity is withheld to protect it from potential prosecution, given the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's »undesirable organisation« status in Russia. The poll was conducted via telephone, with a shortened questionnaire and some terms adapted to ensure respondents’ safety and from political considerations (for instance, the term »special military operation« was used instead of »Russia's war against Ukraine«).
These adaptations and precautions highlight the complexity of conducting polls in conflict zones and under restrictive regimes. While the data provides valuable insights, it's crucial to consider these limitations when interpreting the results, understanding that they offer a snapshot of public opinion under challenging circumstances rather than a comprehensive view.
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