Germany

Germans’ primary concerns are wars and conflicts (82%), inflation (79%) and international terrorism (76%). The proportion of respondents worried about uncontrolled immigration has grown from 61% in 2021 to 73% in 2024 and the level of concern increases with age, opening up a 27 percentage point difference between those aged 18–29 (56%) and 60–75 year olds (83%).
The dynamic of worries about one’s personal future (2021: 57%, 2022: 71%, 2024: 66%) indicates a growing sense of instability after the outbreak of war and a subsequent stabilisation two years later. However, fears of a worsening personal economic situation have grown (2021: 43%, 2024: 50%).

Germans rank among the most satisfied with their status on the international stage.

On the international stage, about 40% believe that Germany lacks the status it deserves, but Germans rank among the most satisfied with their standing in the survey. Nearly 60% of Germans, consistent with the previous survey and the poll average, believe their prosperity is linked to the well-being of other nations. However, this figure is relatively low for an export-dependent economy.

Germany is an active participant in numerous international organisations, but this engagement is only partially reflected in public attitudes. Support for a larger role for the UN remains low, with only 48% in favour, significantly below the 61% survey average. Support remained steady for an expanded role for the EU (49%), for NATO (47%) and for the OSCE (47%).

Key pillars of German foreign policy include a commitment to the EU, with a majority of respondents (61%) supporting closer cooperation within the Union. However, opinion is split on whether there are conflicts between EU policies and Germany’s interests (43% on each side). This is value up on 2021 (35%).

EU–US cooperation strengthened under the Biden administration, but collaboration with the US receives mixed support, with 46% in favour and 42% opposed. The results reflect hardly any increase compared with 2021 (51% in favour). The interests of the US and the EU are seen rather as aligned (47% do not think that their interests are contradictory).

52% of Germans perceive the media reporting as objective, one of the highest figures in the poll. 

Since the onset of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Russia’s image has changed significantly. It is now seen as Europe's biggest threat, with threat perception rising from 51% in 2021 to 73% today. Closer collaboration with Russia and China is widely rejected. Majorities support reducing ties with both countries, even at the cost of a lower standard of living (64% for Russia, 57% for China). Germany has also adopted a »derisking« approach towards China, now perceived as Europe’s second-biggest threat (46%). Nearly 70% agree with reducing dependence on countries that do not share Germany's values. 

The perceived divergences of interests between the US and Russia (63%) and the US and China (58%), are seen as most contradictory, higher than those between the EU and Russia (60%) or the EU and China (51%). The picture suggests that the US is viewed as acting within a more tense geopolitical context than the EU. 
Germany's media is generally recognised as relatively objective, free and diverse. Indeed, it enjoys one of the highest levels of trust (52%) with regard to objective reporting among the surveyed nations, while only a smaller share (37%) perceive the German media as biased.

Germans exhibit a defensive, risk-averse approach, reflected in their historically cautious policies in military affairs and emphasis on dialogue. The vast majority view the end of the war against Ukraine as crucial for improving European security. 

A large majority foresee an upcoming era marked by wars and conflicts, accompanied by »my country first« approach. Germans are increasingly worried about being directly affected by wars and conflicts in the future, with the proportion of those concerned rising from 47% in 2021 to 75% in 2024. The perceived risk of wars in Europe surged from 33% in 2021 to 56% in 2024. However, the perception of the likelihood of military confrontation between Russia and the West has declined in the course of the war against Ukraine, dropping from 48% in 2022 to 40% in 2024, below the average of polled European countries (48%). Additionally, 69% believe Germany could not defend itself against a Russian attack, a figure significantly higher than the NATO average of 53%. This is reflected in the stance of the Olaf Scholz government, which has been following a cautious path in supporting Ukraine with reference to potential Russian threats and the danger of escalation.

On security matters, Germans prioritise diplomacy (64%) over the build-up of an EU Army (49%). Some 57% believe that the EU would be unable to defend itself without US support. At the same time, 68% express a desire for more independence from the US. When asked about a potential leader in EU security, Germany is the only country in the Weimar triangle that is more likely to envision leadership alone (30%) rather than together with France and Poland (28%). Although cooperation between France and Germany remains essential, differences in defence, trade and energy policies are increasing.
Although Germans are the most confident in their country's ability to take on a leadership role in EU security, paradoxically, survey respondents express the highest support, compared with France, Italy and Poland, for Germany to engage less in the EU (28%, but only 18% among those aged 18–29).

Germans are neither as strong supporters of Ukraine as Latvians or Swedes, nor as opposed as Italians. Instead, they remain cautious.

Their support for a stronger leadership role ranks lowest (25%). Germany's leadership position has diminished on the European stage due to internal divides in the governing coalition, a trend also reflected in the poll. However, the largest share (37%) would prefer to strengthen EU institutions.

A trend of disillusionment and war fatigue is evident. Some 46% believe that the war against Ukraine is not going to end within the next 12 months, the third-highest value among the surveyed countries.
Russia is overwhelmingly seen as the aggressor (70%), while Ukraine and the US are blamed by 20% each. In common with most EU member states, except Italy, 31% of respondents attribute Russia's invasion to its imperialist ambitions, while 28% cite long-standing tensions with Ukraine. Few respondents cite as a reason defence of Russia’s interests or an attempt to act as a global player.

Germans are neither as strong supporters of Ukraine within the EU as Latvians or Swedes, nor as opposed as Italians. Instead, they remain cautious, with support declining since the 2022 survey, similar to France. 
The highest share of German respondents (44%) favour diplomatic efforts. About a quarter support a neutral stance or backing Ukraine until victory, respectively. While 48% support continued assistance to Ukraine (below the EU average of 55%), 36% oppose further support. This is due mainly to a desire for the war to end (72%) or concerns about its cost (18%). A narrow majority (53%, higher than the NATO average of 44%) believe the war should end as soon as possible, even if it results in territorial losses for Ukraine. Only 27% support restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity, even if it is at the cost of prolonging the war.

Germany's historical military restraint is evident in its continued reluctance, on top of war fatigue among the population. The majority oppose further weapons deliveries (54%) and strongly reject sending troops (79%). Support for Ukraine’s NATO membership (50% opposed, 32% in favour) and EU membership (49% opposed, 36% in favour) has declined since 2022. However, 53% now support expanding sanctions against Russia, up from 37% in 2021. 
As broader effects of the war, NATO, the US and China are seen as largely unaffected, while Russia is perceived as weakened (33%). The EU and Germany are seen as either unaffected or weakened.

There is a prevailing belief that global developments over the next five years will worsen, which has largely remained unchanged since the last survey: globally (69%), in Europe (59%) and in Germany (53%). This positions Germany, alongside France, as the two most pessimistic countries in the poll.

Germany, alongside France, ranks as the most pessimistic in the poll.

Foreign policy priorities include combating terrorism and extremism (62%, 2022: 42%) and international migration (44%, 18–29: 24%), and tackling climate change (43%).
There has been a clear inward turn in public sentiment. Since 2021, concerns about the decline in social cohesion have grown. Some 65% oppose promoting German values abroad, the highest figure in the poll. Nevertheless, 61% are in favour of pursuing an active foreign policy and playing a significant role in tackling international problems.

Internationally, Germans tend to believe that rules and laws in international relations remain relevant. Promoting peace is seen primarily in terms of diplomatic negotiations, considered the most effective and legitimate tool. Key methods include diplomacy (54%, 35% among 18-29 year-olds), disarmament initiatives and strengthening international organisations (about 30% each). Scepticism towards military interventions has risen sharply (from 56% in 2022 to 69% in 2024) and they are perceived as the least legitimate option. The majority oppose nuclear weapons, but 26% of 18-29 year-olds consider them a last resort, twice the 14-country average.
German respondents express general dissatisfaction with current climate policies, while the EU's measures receive the highest approval (32%, with 42% among those aged 18–29). A strong majority (68%) still believe that international collaboration is crucial. However, despite Germany's wealth, it shares with the US and Latvia the lowest support for protecting poor and vulnerable countries (59%). 

Regarding the government’s approach to new public borrowing and investments, a contentious issue in Germany since the »debt brake« was enshrined in the constitution in 2009, Germans are fairly divided: 45% oppose new debt for future investments, while 40% support it. Notably, support for new debt is lower among those under 40.

Support for increasing military spending is high, with 54% in favour, a 16% increase from 2021. However, 55% reject prioritising defence spending over social expenditures. The preferred method of financing defence is a special levy on the rich (47%), while 24% support cuts in other areas. New borrowing is supported by only 11%, which is the highest proportion in the poll.

Scepticism towards military interventions has risen sharply, from 56% in 2022 to almost 70% in 2024.