Latvia

Latvian concerns about the future are substantial. Almost 80% express apprehension about what lies ahead. The primary concerns are wars and conflicts, inflation, and economic crises, while climate change ranks lowest. Only 44% worry that their economic situation will deteriorate. 

Some 68% of Latvians perceive that the well-being of their country is linked to positive developments in other nations. In terms of global standing, just 47% believe that Latvia does not have the status it deserves, a comparatively low figure, consistent with 2022.

Latvians emphasise their country’s strategic dependence on alliances and have a generally positive view of international institutions such as the UN, NATO and the EU. Support for most institutions has diminished since the 2021 survey, except for NATO, which has remained stable. The Latvian government supports a stronger NATO presence and the foreign policy focus includes gaining a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (2026–2027).

The focus on collective security is reflected in the lowest approval in our poll of a »my country first« approach (48%). Some 64% favour reducing dependence on countries that do not share their values. Some 82% seek stronger ties with the Baltic and Nordic States and 73% with the EU. Fewer than 40% view Latvian interests as being in conflict with EU policies. Around half of respondents favour stronger cooperation with the US, while 38% support closer ties with China. Notably, only 38% prioritise reducing reliance on China, the lowest level in the poll. Latvia seeks to achieve a balanced trade relationship with China while also seeking China's support in efforts to resolve the war against Ukraine. Perceptions of China as a threat to Europe have remained stable, rising only slightly from 32% in 2021 to 35% in 2024. In light of the Russian threat, only 20% favour closer ties with Russia, while 60% seek to reduce dependence. 

The perception of divergence between global powers has decreased since the last survey in 2022. Still, EU–Russian and US–Chinese interests are seen as most contradictory. Relatedly, 63% expect a new era of wars and conflicts, although most people answer ‘don’t know’ when asked whether there will be a new world war.

Overall, media perceptions are divided (48% non-objective, 39% objective), but have been improving in recent years. Since the war broke out in Ukraine, Latvia's ethnic Russian population has become more isolated, in a media landscape that has been divided for years, with Russian-language media becoming rare. 

Accordingly, perceptions differ: 45% of Latvian speakers see it as objective, compared with 15% of the Russian-speaking minority. Overall, the perception of the Russian-speaking minority tends to be more pro-Russian, showing less support for Ukraine and limited engagement with the US.

Latvians show the lowest approval of a »my country first« approach.

Half of respondents see Russia as a threat for Europe. Around 53%, above the average, see the EU as vulnerable without US support. Furthermore, 74% believe that Latvia lacks sufficient defensive capabilities and could not defend itself if Russia declared war, the second-highest figure in the poll alongside Georgia. Both are comparatively small countries directly neighbouring Russia.

A majority (77%) view the end of the war against Ukraine as essential for improving European security. Concerns about Russia as a threat to European security remain high at 71%. By stark contrast, the Russian-speaking minority’s perception is just 8%. What’s more, within this minority, perceptions of a US threat rise significantly to 52%, compared with 28% of the total population. 

Perceptions of NATO enlargement towards the Russian border and of the EU towards the East diverge from those of the other polled countries. Latvians tend not to view them as a threat to European security, while concerns are rising in other surveyed countries. Support for diplomacy as a means of resolving foreign policy crises has decreased, from 69% in 2021 to 58% in 2024. Reluctance toward military intervention in conflicts remains high, with 67% rejecting it, the same level as 2021.

For leadership in EU security, the trio of Germany, France, and Poland is most commonly seen as the leading force (36%), although 21% responded ‘don’t know’. Support for an EU Army remains consistent at 50% and has not increased since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Nearly 70% express a desire for greater independence from the US. To stabilise European security after the war, 38% advocate that Latvia should foster channels of communication with Russia.
Russian-speaking minority tends to be more pro-Russian, sees media reporting as not objective and shows less support for Ukraine.

Latvian attitudes reflect opposition to aggression and a strategic dependence on alliances. Respondents identify Russia as the aggressor (72%) and as an imperialist state (37%). The invasion is seen mainly as a quest for territory (42%) rather than a proxy war or a fight between democracies and autocracies.

Latvians show strong support in the poll for continued aid to Ukraine (62%). However, only 18% of the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia share this view. Furthermore, 51% in Latvia are in favour of sustaining support until victory. However, only 15% believe Ukraine can achieve a military victory, which is the second-highest level of confidence in the poll. This discrepancy underscores a disconnect: while there is substantial support for continued assistance, confidence in a successful outcome is limited.

The strong pro-Ukrainian stance is reflected in the fact that 30% of respondents believe it is necessary that Russia lose the war, even at the risk of escalation. If Germany or the US stopped their support, Latvian opinion is evenly split on whether to continue their support. This reflects their reliance on strong allies. 

Support is desired mainly through military aid. Latvians also express strong backing for sanctions against Russia. However, 74% oppose deploying troops, with only 12% in favour, less than the average of polled NATO states, perhaps due to fears of potential Russian aggression. Around 44% oppose increased weapons deliveries, perhaps because Latvia’s own military aid to Ukraine has depleted its weapons stocks. 
Most Latvians are in favour of Ukraine joining NATO and the EU (both around 54%). 

The war is seen as strengthening NATO (37%) and weakening Russia (45%). The US (42%), China (38%) and Latvia (35%) are perceived as neither stronger nor weaker as a result of the war. However, these strong stances are predominantly held by the Latvian-speaking population; the Russian-speaking minority tends to adopt a more pro-Russian perspective, opposing sanctions against Russia and Ukraine's membership of NATO or the EU.

The war against Ukraine has affected domestic policy. This includes reintroducing compulsory military service and emphasising the Latvian language as a symbol of national identity, aiming to reduce Russian-language media content. The majority (37%, 18–29: 30%) believe that the debate is too much focused on Russian influence, detracting from other issues. This view is shared by 33% of the Russian-speaking minority and 54% of Latvians. Notably, 30% of all respondents (35% of Latvians and only 5% of Russians) consider the Russian-speaking minority a major issue. At the same time, 16% do not see any societal division and advocate for a greater focus on social cohesion, a worry shared by 67% of respondents.

Furthermore, only 44% of respondents view Ukrainian refugees as an added value. Agreement is even lower among younger respondents.

The Latvian public remains predominantly pessimistic about future developments, although younger Latvians display more optimism. 

The nation prioritises national security and sees limited value in cooperation beyond its core aspirations and principles. Latvian respondents are willing to reduce dependencies on countries that do not align with their values (64%). International engagement without direct benefits ranks relatively low (32% approval). Given the country’s defensive position, there is a slight decline in Latvia's stance on pursuing an active foreign policy and playing a significant role in solving international problems (2021: 54%, 2024: 49%). Therefore, 50% declare that military deterrence in the Baltic Sea should be a priority for Latvia's foreign policy.

Climate change ranks low among Latvian priorities. Only 30%, below the poll average, support taking all possible measures to combat it, while nearly half favour adaptation strategies. Latvia’s relatively low approval of international cooperation on climate change may reflect its focus on domestic challenges. 

Diplomatic efforts are viewed as legitimate, but their perceived effectiveness is lower than in 2021. Overall, Latvia's defensive posture aligns with its growing regional significance within NATO and the EU. Latvia's top priorities are combating terrorism (53%), addressing geopolitical tensions (51%) and military build-up (37%). 

Latvia's military spending has risen, accelerated by Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The government plans to increase defence spending, with a target of 3% of GDP by 2027, ranking it among NATO's top four contributors by share of GDP. Approval for higher military spending has risen from 37% in 2021 to 49% in 2024, while 40% remain opposed. Overall, Latvians favour social and economic spending over defence (60%). If defence spending is necessary, they prefer a special levy on the rich (47%) over cutting social or economic funds (18%). 

Approval for higher military spending has risen from 37% in 2021 to 49% in 2024.