Georgia

[forward-looking and balancing]

Georgia has a complex blend of influences from both Europe and Asia. Since gaining its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia has pursued closer ties with Western institutions, including aspirations to join NATO and the European Union, while maintaining relations with Russia. In 2008, escalating tensions erupted into a five-day war, after which Russia recognised the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The conflict ended with an EU-brokered ceasefire agreement.

Taking a broader view, geopolitical influences from both Russia and the European Union are crucial in shaping Georgia's fortunes. Georgia has strengthened its Western alignment, signing an Association Agreement with the EU in 2014 and applying for EU membership in March 2022, a move accelerated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The path towards Europe has become the main domestic conflict in late 2024, however.

Self-perception

Georgians feel most secure in their immediate surroundings compared with other countries (93%). This feeling of security is accompanied by the second-lowest level of concern regarding a decline in personal economic situation (40%). 

Some 90% of Georgians are concerned, along with Turks and Ukrainians, about inflation, the cost of living and economic crises. This mood is also influenced by high unemployment (youth unemployment stands at 30%) and widespread informal employment. These components collectively account for the observed outcome that 86% express concerns about their personal future, the second-highest level in the poll after Ukraine. 

Georgians are conscious of global interdependencies, and 79% feel that Georgia’s well-being is linked to positive developments in other countries. However, 68% feel that Georgia does not receive the status it deserves, 13% higher than the poll average.
 

Perception of the world

Their prevailing sentiment is that an era of a »my country first« is dawning. Georgians still very much believe in the Western-dominated security order, having the lowest rate of agreement that the era of American supremacy is over (28%). They also have the third-highest approval that Europe is becoming a global power (44%). Among 18–29 year olds, this percentage rises to nearly 60%. Georgians are least convinced that middle powers such as Türkiye or Brazil are emerging as new centres of influence. In contrast to Russian respondents, Georgians show the lowest agreement that laws and rules are no longer relevant.

Georgians believe in the Western-dominated security order: 44% think that Europe is becoming a global power and only 28% agree that the era of American supremacy is over.

The overwhelming majority in Georgia prefer stronger cooperation with the EU (85%), the highest support in the poll, next to Ukraine. At the same time, opinion is split on whether EU politics are regularly in conflict with the interests of Georgia (43% each agreeing and disagreeing). EU membership has been supported by a majority of Georgians for many years. When asked about the reasons for EU membership, most people choose higher living standards (49%). They also cite EU funding, as well as security from Russia. Diving deeper into the findings suggests that young Georgians are more pro-Western, particularly in terms of foreign policy and international alliances. This generational shift could have significant implications for Georgia’s future direction, possibly with regard to closer ties with the EU. Georgia's relations with the EU soured after controversial laws were introduced in 2024 curbing LGBTQ+ rights and targeting foreign-funded civil society groups. 
 

Young Georgians are more pro-Western than older generations.

The EU paused its accession process, and the internal Georgian conflict about the European perspective has 
intensified since.

However, an either-or framing oversimplifies the situation. An absolute majority of Georgians (58%) support a balanced approach between the EU and Russia, rather than aligning with one side at the cost of deteriorating relations with the other. Nonetheless, 43% of polled Georgians desire more cooperation with Russia (50% oppose closer ties), although only a quarter of those aged 18–29 support this. At the same time, there is also a wish to reduce reliance on Russia, even if it has a negative impact on living standards in Georgia (58%).

Outside the narrow Russia-versus-the-West framing, Georgians support enhanced cooperation – 76% with the USA and 60% with China. At the same time, they want to reduce dependency on China (51%). In contrast to Ukraine, they show relatively low support for reducing dependency on non-like-minded states, which reflects a distinctive and pragmatic stance on this issue.

Perception of the Russian war against Ukraine

Georgians suffered from Russian aggression in the 2008 five-day war. Afterward, Russia recognised the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These became more dependent on Moscow. Russia continues to maintain bases and troops there. Against this backdrop, Georgians avoid taking a strong position on the war against Ukraine. Instead, they favour a neutral stance (40%), the highest endorsement for that in the poll, and support diplomatic efforts to end the war (38%). A majority (58%) hold Russia responsible for the ongoing war, while 33% point to the US and 24% to Ukraine. Notably, among younger people perceptions of responsibility on the part of both Russia and Ukraine are higher, while blame toward the US is lower.

Moreover, the war is mostly (42%) perceived as a proxy war between the West and Russia. This stance is shared only in Serbia and Türkiye. Some 36% view the war as an attempt by Russia to expand its territory. This perception is even more pronounced among those aged 18 to 29 (43%). Notably, it is lower than in western European nations such as France, the UK and Sweden, where it exceeds 60%. Less than 5% lean towards the third characterisation, namely that it is a war between democracies and autocracies. 

58% support a balanced approach between the EU and Russia, rather than aligning with one side at the cost of deteriorating relations with the other.

However, the geographical proximity to Russia is reflected in the fact that most people are worried about nuclear escalation (76%). This is not surprising given Russia's recent nuclear exercises and threats to use nuclear weapons.

The Georgian government maintains a neutral, possibly defensive stance. Still, a large majority (74%) advocate continued support for Ukraine, the second highest in the poll. Georgian respondents are the strongest proponents of humanitarian assistance. Accordingly, they reject the idea of sending troops, the second-highest level in the poll. When it comes to increased weapon deliveries, people are also sceptical, but women support this slightly more than men (23% vs 18%). Georgians support Ukraine becoming an EU member (72%) and a NATO member (64%).

Regarding an end of the war, Georgians express more optimism for a diplomatic solution than people in any other polled country (48%). This might stem from experience with a ceasefire in their own country, which was brokered by the EU in 2008. The ceasefire neither settled the conflict nor returned occupied territories, but it stopped the fighting and safeguarded Georgia’s independence.
 

The way forward

Georgia's further course is dependent largely on internal political developments. The contested October 2024 parliamentary elections in Georgia drew international attention amid allegations of fraud and irregularities. The ruling Georgian Dream party secured a fourth consecutive term. This sparked protests in Tbilisi, demanding new elections. Many see the unrest as part of a broader geopolitical struggle between Russia and the West. Still, Georgians express the most optimistic views in the poll about developments regarding peace and security over the next five years – in Georgia, Europe and globally. Women are overall more positive.

Georgia seeks to play a more engaged role, with nearly 71% supporting a proactive foreign policy to address international problems, crises and conflicts. They show the highest levels of agreement to take on more international responsibility and to cooperate with any country if it is conducive to peace. Foreign policy priorities should include concerns about human rights violations (36%), geopolitical tensions (33%) and fighting terrorism and extremism (25%), while trade wars and global inequality play a minor role.

However, Georgia’s commitment to international responsibility is somewhat limited: almost 70% indicate that Georgia should focus on its own well-being and avoid international involvement. Only 20% are in favour of military interventions in conflicts. Together with Ukraine, united by the Russian aggression, they have the highest approval rate for increasing military spending (77%). However, about two-thirds (67% women, 59% men) prioritise economic and social over defence spending. Notably, among 18–29 year olds, 34% support prioritising military spending, compared with a total of 24%.

Georgians express more optimism for a diplomatic solution in the war against Ukraine than people in any other polled country.

About Security Radar 2025 

Security Radar 2025 is a representative public opinion poll conducted in September 2024 among the resident populations in 14 countries: Germany, France, Georgia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Türkiye, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States.

Public opinion may have a substantial impact on political decision-makers facing security issues, particularly at a time of high tensions and major uncertainty. The aim of the Security Radar Survey Series is to track changes in public opinion regarding issues relating to foreign-, security, and defense policy. Prior editions of the Security Radar Survey Series have been published in 2019, 2022, and 2023.

The focus of the Security Radar 2025 is to explore changes in public opinion since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To this end, we compare two surveys: The first is the Security Radar 2022, conducted in 14 countries prior to the outbreak of the war in autumn 2021, and published at the Munich Security Conference just days before the invasion. The second is the present Security Radar 2025, conducted three year later. This allows us to compare people’s attitudes directly before the invasion with attitudes almost three years into the war. For four EU members – France, Germany, Latvia and Poland – we have three data points to compare (as these four countries featured in the follow-up Security Radar 2023, which explored changes in public attitudes nine months into the war, in autumn 2022).

About the Survey

By »Europe« we understand the space covered by the members of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In certain obvious cases, however, we use »Europe« interchangeably with »the EU«. When we use the term »the West«, we mean the EU together with the USA. The pollster Ipsos Public Affairs in Berlin was assigned to carry out the fieldwork in twelve of the fourteen countries; in Georgia, the fieldwork was carried out by Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC). In Russia, the fieldwork was conducted by an independent pollster, whose name we decided not to disclose because of the risk of criminal liability. The survey is based on the Security Radar 2023 questionnaire, adapted and extended in line with developments related to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Overall, we explore and compare public opinion on the current security and foreign policy situation in Europe, focusing on seven aspects:

  1. perception of the current threat situation;
  2. attitudes towards foreign and security policy;
  3. attitudes towards international organisations;
  4. attitudes towards national identity;
  5. attitudes towards the EU, the United States, NATO, Russia and China;
  6. perception of Russia’s war against Ukraine;
  7. perception of climate change and its effects on security in Europe.

Polling during wartime

Conducting polls during wartime presents significant challenges, requiring cautious interpretation of the results. In Ukraine, ongoing hostilities in Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk regions prevented their inclusion in the sample, affecting the survey’s representativeness. The war has also altered Ukraine's demographics, with millions of people, particularly women, leaving the country and many men serving at the front.

Wartime conditions also increase the likelihood that people will provide what they perceive to be socially desirable responses, potentially skewing results. This may be especially the case in Russia, where repressive laws exacerbate this tendency. Despite these challenges, including Russia and Ukraine in the Security Radar survey remains crucial because of their significant roles in European security. The survey was last conducted in Russia and Ukraine in 2021, a few months before the full-scale invasion.

Data in Ukraine was gathered by Ipsos via online questionnaire. To gather data in Russia, an independent polling company was commissioned, although its identity is withheld to protect it from potential prosecution, given the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's »undesirable organisation« status in Russia. The poll was conducted via telephone, with a shortened questionnaire and some terms adapted to ensure respondents’ safety and from political considerations (for instance, the term »special military operation« was used instead of »Russia's war against Ukraine«).

These adaptations and precautions highlight the complexity of conducting polls in conflict zones and under restrictive regimes. While the data provides valuable insights, it's crucial to consider these limitations when interpreting the results, understanding that they offer a snapshot of public opinion under challenging circumstances rather than a comprehensive view.

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