The key information of this website can be found in our interactive graphics. They can be customized by selecting specific years, weapon systems, countries or groups of countries respectively to filter the information needed by the user. The graphics are complemented by small texts, explaining the aim of the project, the research focus and some conclusions derived from the data relating to deterrence in Europe.

“The Military Balance by IISS provides an assessment of the armed forces and defence economics of 173 countries and territories. Each edition provides a unique compilation of data and information, enabling the reader to discern trends by studying editions as far back as 1959.” (The Military Balance 2024: p.532) The data for the year 2008 are taken from the IISS Military Balance 2009 publication, the data for the year 2023 from the IISS Military Balance 2024 publication. The data in the 2024 edition is accurate according to IISS assessments as of November 2023. Data from SIPRI and NATO were used for defence spending trends. In addition, some German and Austrian sources were used to validate the data as a whole.

• https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/5261462/b60dd780d41a5c5b8e03e8b8275230bd/waffensysteme-und-grossgeraet-data.pdf
• https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ausruestung-technik-bundeswehr/landsysteme-bundeswehr
• https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2665366/f0966159592a217d4e654f334a532258/abrbericht2023-data.pdf
• https://www.bmlv.gv.at/wissen-forschung/publikationen/thema.php?id=18

Using reputable sources (as mentioned above), a robust data structure has been created that provides a comprehensive visualisation of each country's military capabilities. However, it's crucial to acknowledge the sensitive nature of this information. The exact number of deployable units can never be determined with absolute certainty due to the classified nature of some military data. Instead, the figures presented are highly informed estimates. These estimates, while not exact, are derived from extensive research and expert analysis. They are sufficiently accurate to enable reliable assessments and comparisons of military strengths and capabilities. The database thus serves as a valuable tool for understanding global military dynamics, despite the inherent limitations in accessing fully precise military information.

Our focus is security in Europe and more specifically the growing tensions between NATO and Russia. Therefore, we have included all members of the alliance, including the US, plus members of the EU, Ukraine, as well as Russia and Belarus. In the maps we offer the option to select different settings like the NATO with and without the US, the EU, specific groupings of member states, whereas we also allow for the selection of Russia alone or in combination with Belarus.

To allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics at hand, we decided to compare the figures for 2008 and 2023 to map significant changes in the amount and quality of equipment. 2008 marks a turning point in European security policy, with the NATO Bucharest Summit in April and the war between Russia and Georgia in August. In addition, two major military reforms and a restructuring of the defence sector took place in Russia during this period. Comparing 2008 and 2023 can help understand the degree of modernisation, that took place in this period.

The war in Ukraine has shown, that a land-war based on traditional weapons systems is a probable scenario, should a conventional conflict take place. In such a scenario, the number and quality of weapons count. Additionally, five of the six categories of weapons we compare, are based on the CFE Treaty.

MBT:
All Main Battle Tanks except for, wheeled tanks, reconnaissance tanks and tanks armed only with anti-tank missiles.

APC/IFV:
Includes armoured personnel carriers (exceeding police armour standards), infantry fighting vehicles and mine resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs).

ARTY / MLRS:
Includes 105mm - 203mm calibre towed and self-propelled artillery and 122mm - 300mm multiple rocket launchers. Mortars are not included.

HELICOPTERS:
Helicopters include all types that can be used without major modification for close air support, military air transport, combat operations of all kinds or military tasks in general. In our case, this definition goes beyond the CFE meaning of attack helicopters.

Fighter jets:
Fighter aircraft are designed and equipped to engage targets in the air or on the ground. Excluded from this definition are training aircraft, refuelling aircraft, transport aircraft, drones and specialised aircraft such as AWACS.

SAM:
Includes all vehicle-based and stationary air and missile defence systems. The figure for SAM reflects the number of launchers. Aegis Ashore sites with SM-3 missiles and A-135 / A-235 PL-19 systems are not included. Shoulder-launched air defence missile systems (Stinger, Strela, Igla, Mistral, etc.) are not counted as SAMs.

Air defence capabilities have been added as a sixth category to reflect the increased importance of these weapons systems in the course of the A2/AD discussions and in the context of the war in Ukraine.

As we focus on the scenario of a conventional land war in Europe, nuclear and maritime capabilities as well as strategic enablers have not been included and may be added to this analysis at a later stage.

The classification into generations was based on available information about the age, technology, performance and survivability of each weapon system. Increases in combat value and modernization of older systems were accordingly considered.

Overview Weapon Systems by Generations

• The quality and quantity of the six main weapons categories we selected for the states included in the project.
• The individual defence profiles of the selected countries.
• The comparison between NATO and Russia, as well as certain groups of countries and Russia in the six selected weapons categories.

Fighting a war requires the capabilites, as well as the political will. Both of them are usually connected, but there is a striking difference in the transparency of these two elements. Therefore, we focus on the capabilities states have to fight wars, which we can show with a considerable amount of certainty. Knowing what armaments states possess gives no indication about the intentions and political aims the respective governments want to achieve with this equipment. Showing these is impossible.

The joint military capability potentials of Russia and Belarus, or the Union State, have become increasingly significant due to several long-standing bilateral processes. Both countries share a common threat perception, viewing NATO and more generally Western influence as primary security concerns. This has led to deepened political and security integration, with key strategic documents being updated and a new Union State Security Concept expected by 2025. The deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus marks a major strengthening of their strategic partnership, with both countries practicing scenarios for their potential use in joint exercises. Military integration has intensified, with Belarus adjusting its strategy based on Russia's experience in Ukraine and participating in regular joint drills. Furthermore, the complementary security policy rhetoric of political elites in both countries reinforces their alignment, with leaders Lukashenko and Putin consistently emphasizing the need for a "common defence space" and increased cooperation in the face of perceived Western threats. Since we want to look at different, sometimes firmly and sometimes loosely institutionalised state constellations, to the inclusion of the Belarusian armed forces in the slideshow is complementing the full picture, since the project aims for a large-scale comparison of forces between Russia plus her allies and the West.