The perception of threats in Europe has fundamentally changed. Russia’s full scale war against Ukraine has ignited new fears in European societies of a direct military confrontation. Military deterrence in Europe is back on the agenda and drives the focus of political and societal debates on Europe’s defence capabilities.
Parallelly to supporting Ukraine with weapons systems, NATO and EU member states have amped up deterrence by starting to strengthen their own militaries. The central question is: Can the defence capabilities of NATO and EU member states deter Russia?
The prospect of a Russian attack on NATO member countries, as well as a potential US disengagement from NATO call for a more thorough look at the Alliance's military equipment.
This project aims at facilitating better access to the available data and allowing citizens to participate in this debate with reliable information.
By providing the basic facts about military capabilities and visualising them in our maps, we want to facilitate an informed debate about security in Europe and help a broader public to join in.
The aim of the project is to develop a transparent and comprehensible tool for analysing military capabilities of different countries, alliances and groups of states. By visualizing complex data, it facilitates a greater understanding of the conventional balance of forces in Europe. The project addresses both experts and the wider public.
Using our different graphical tools, fundamental questions around deterrence in Europe can be explored
In order to build this platform, we conducted four steps:
The key information of this website can be found in our interactive graphics. They can be customized by selecting specific years, weapon systems, countries or groups of countries respectively to filter the information needed by the user. The graphics are complemented by small texts, explaining the aim of the project, the research focus and some conclusions derived from the data relating to deterrence in Europe.
“The Military Balance by IISS provides an assessment of the armed forces and defence economics of 173 countries and territories. Each edition provides a unique compilation of data and information, enabling the reader to discern trends by studying editions as far back as 1959.” (The Military Balance 2024: p.532) The data for the year 2008 are taken from the IISS Military Balance 2009 publication, the data for the year 2023 from the IISS Military Balance 2024 publication. The data in the 2024 edition is accurate according to IISS assessments as of November 2023. Data from SIPRI and NATO were used for defence spending trends. In addition, some German and Austrian sources were used to validate the data as a whole.
Using reputable sources (as mentioned above), a robust data structure has been created that provides a comprehensive visualisation of each country's military capabilities. However, it's crucial to acknowledge the sensitive nature of this information. The exact number of deployable units can never be determined with absolute certainty due to the classified nature of some military data. Instead, the figures presented are highly informed estimates. These estimates, while not exact, are derived from extensive research and expert analysis. They are sufficiently accurate to enable reliable assessments and comparisons of military strengths and capabilities. The database thus serves as a valuable tool for understanding global military dynamics, despite the inherent limitations in accessing fully precise military information.
Our focus is security in Europe and more specifically the growing tensions between NATO and Russia. Therefore, we have included all members of the alliance, including the US, plus members of the EU, Ukraine, as well as Russia and Belarus. In the maps we offer the option to select different settings like the NATO with and without the US, the EU, specific groupings of member states, whereas we also allow for the selection of Russia alone or in combination with Belarus.
To allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics at hand, we decided to compare the figures for 2008 and 2023 to map significant changes in the amount and quality of equipment. 2008 marks a turning point in European security policy, with the NATO Bucharest Summit in April and the war between Russia and Georgia in August. In addition, two major military reforms and a restructuring of the defence sector took place in Russia during this period. Comparing 2008 and 2023 can help understand the degree of modernisation, that took place in this period.
The war in Ukraine has shown, that a land-war based on traditional weapons systems is a probable scenario, should a conventional conflict take place. In such a scenario, the number and quality of weapons count. Additionally, five of the six categories of weapons we compare, are based on the CFE Treaty.
MBT:All Main Battle Tanks except for, wheeled tanks, reconnaissance tanks and tanks armed only with anti-tank missiles.
APC/IFV:Includes armoured personnel carriers (exceeding police armour standards), infantry fighting vehicles and mine resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs).
ARTY / MLRS:Includes 105mm - 203mm calibre towed and self-propelled artillery and 122mm - 300mm multiple rocket launchers. Mortars are not included.
HELICOPTERS:Helicopters include all types that can be used without major modification for close air support, military air transport, combat operations of all kinds or military tasks in general. In our case, this definition goes beyond the CFE meaning of attack helicopters.
Fighter jets:Fighter aircraft are designed and equipped to engage targets in the air or on the ground. Excluded from this definition are training aircraft, refuelling aircraft, transport aircraft, drones and specialised aircraft such as AWACS.
SAM:Includes all vehicle-based and stationary air and missile defence systems. The figure for SAM reflects the number of launchers. Aegis Ashore sites with SM-3 missiles and A-135 / A-235 PL-19 systems are not included. Shoulder-launched air defence missile systems (Stinger, Strela, Igla, Mistral, etc.) are not counted as SAMs.
Air defence capabilities have been added as a sixth category to reflect the increased importance of these weapons systems in the course of the A2/AD discussions and in the context of the war in Ukraine.
As we focus on the scenario of a conventional land war in Europe, nuclear and maritime capabilities as well as strategic enablers have not been included and may be added to this analysis at a later stage.
The classification into generations was based on available information about the age, technology, performance and survivability of each weapon system. Increases in combat value and modernization of older systems were accordingly considered.
Overview Weapon Systems by Generations
Fighting a war requires the capabilites, as well as the political will. Both of them are usually connected, but there is a striking difference in the transparency of these two elements. Therefore, we focus on the capabilities states have to fight wars, which we can show with a considerable amount of certainty. Knowing what armaments states possess gives no indication about the intentions and political aims the respective governments want to achieve with this equipment. Showing these is impossible.
Overall overview of equipment based on the six selected weapon system categories for 2023 in a comparison of NATO vs. Russia
In this chart we show the complete active stocks of the respective equipment in the corresponding categories. Nevertheless, it needs to be noted, that the USA in particular, but also Russia, France, and the UK to a much smaller degree, deploy contingents outside Europe. There are estimates that the USA could only deploy just over half of its armed forces potential in a single theatre of war.
Active personnel, defence spending and GDP of the countries surveyed
Between 2008 and 2023, the total number of active military personnel in all current NATO countries decreased by 22%. It currently stands at around 3.2 million. On the Russian side, about 1.1 million were under arms in 2023.
The European NATO countries have more than 700,000 more troops than Russia. To put this into perspective, that number is higher than the total of troops currently deployed by Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine.
When comparing the differences between the defence spending of Russia and NATO, it is necessary to take purchasing power differences into account. Therefore, the stark difference between $ 1.257 bn of NATO and $ 74 bn of Russia amounts to a smaller gap in what the respective actors can get for their money in equipment. More information concerning this aspect can be found in our reading recommendations.
A brief military profile can be activated on this map for each country included in the analysis. The short profile texts include the most notable developments in military equipment, the financial development of the defence budget in relation to the country's GDP and a brief insight into their military assistance to Ukraine, if any.
Visualisation of the military capabilities of all 39 states + selected state constellations in comparison with Russia or Russia + Belarus.
This graphic is the most densely packed with information of our project. Three drop-down menus for all countries or groups of countries (at the bottom of the graph in the slider) allow users to navigate independently all quantitative and qualitative results with individually selectable weapon generations.
The joint military capability potentials of Russia and Belarus, or the Union State, have become increasingly significant due to several long-standing bilateral processes. Both countries share a common threat perception, viewing NATO and more generally Western influence as primary security concerns. This has led to deepened political and security integration, with key strategic documents being updated and a new Union State Security Concept expected by 2025. The deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus marks a major strengthening of their strategic partnership, with both countries practicing scenarios for their potential use in joint exercises. Military integration has intensified, with Belarus adjusting its strategy based on Russia's experience in Ukraine and participating in regular joint drills. Furthermore, the complementary security policy rhetoric of political elites in both countries reinforces their alignment, with leaders Lukashenko and Putin consistently emphasizing the need for a "common defence space" and increased cooperation in the face of perceived Western threats. Since we want to look at different, sometimes firmly and sometimes loosely institutionalised state constellations, to the inclusion of the Belarusian armed forces in the slideshow is complementing the full picture, since the project aims for a large-scale comparison of forces between Russia plus her allies and the West.
Some interesting aspects can be pointed out:
NATO countries have more and more modern weapons than Russia in five categories. Russia has an advantage in the number of air defence launchers.
If we focus only on the capacities of the EU, we can note that the total number of battle tanks in the EU outnumbers Russian tanks by 1,860 or 93%. Russia, on the other hand, has almost three times as many SAM systems/launchers of various ranges and all generations in service as the EU (2,513 vs. 868). The Soviet Union relied heavily on land-based air and missile defence in its military planning. Russia has followed the same path in recent decades. This fact plays an important role in the current war in Ukraine.
Artillery plays an important role in a war of attrition. The visualisation shows that the number of ARTY/MLRS systems contributed by Greece, Finland and Poland alone (2,563 in total) accounts for 38% of the total stockpile of European NATO countries. Certain capabilities are not evenly distributed across alliances and groups of countries. There are traditional emphases, national characteristics that can be traced back to security policy features and hence military planning.
Two further interesting observations emerge from the qualitative analysis:
The EU possesses significantly more modern artillery. A more detailed analysis of artillery reveals that the EU has 147 units of 5th generation artillery. Russia, on the other hand, has 28 units.
The Weimar Triangle (comprising Germany, France and Poland) has 1668 5th generation armoured troop carriers or infantry fighting vehicles, while the Russian side currently has zero.
Since 2008, both the West and Russia have reduced major weapons systems. Russia has seen a bigger drop than the West. This may seem strange at first: However, most Western countries reduced their army while upgrading their armed forces for counter-terrorism and stabilisation operations. In the course of these developments, the equipment profile changed. There was less focus on main battle tanks (MBTs) and more on modular systems based on armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles. NATO countries have been more successful than Russia in modernising their equipment.
The analysis allows the formulation of precise statements regarding the conventional balance of power in Europe. By comparing the quantitative and qualitative aspects of military equipment, it is possible to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the individual countries. The results of the project provide an empirical basis for the debate on NATO's deterrence of Russia.
Nonetheless, there is a need to look into intentions, signalling, strategies and other aspects shedding light on the aims of military capabilities. The threatening rhetoric, troop concentrations with correspondingly high-ranking intentions to attack NATO alliance territory or the lack of such intentions and precautions on the Russian side have been and will be discussed at length and controversially. However, the focus of this visualisation project is, for the time being, on the other side of the coin, namely the question of ability rather than will.
Some of the aspects we can’t show in our graphics, can be explored by delving into additional literature.
Our recommendations for further reading:
Simon Weiß
