Kazakhstan

[neutral and distanced]

Kazakhstan, strategically located between Europe and Asia, is rich in natural resources, such as oil, gas and uranium. After gaining independence from the Soviet Union in December 1991, the country focused on modernising its economy and consolidating power around the long-time ruler Nursultan Nazarbayev, who in 2019 passed on the reins to his successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.
In early 2022, widespread unrest erupted over rising fuel prices, economic inequality and calls for political reform. The government imposed a state of emergency, and the protests were suppressed with the decisive help of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation, of which Kazakhstan is a member. President Tokayev thus managed to preserve his power and promised political reforms and anti-corruption measures to address public dissatisfaction. A constitutional referendum introduced reforms to strengthen the lower house of parliament (Mazhilis), implement a mixed electoral system, establish a constitutional court, and abolish the death penalty. These reforms consolidated the existing authoritarian regime.

Self-perception

Kazakhs’ biggest concerns are inflation (89%), wars and conflicts (87%) and international terrorism (82%). Around 80% are worried about their personal future, while concerns about a worsening of their own economic situation ranks lowest in the poll (30%).

A majority (60%) believe that Kazakhstan’s prosperity is linked to the well-being of other countries. Kazakhs feel rather satisfied with Kazakhstan’s status in the international arena: just 44% feel that the country lacks the global status it deserves. This figure aligns with Sweden (44%) and is considerably lower than those of Poland (64%), Georgia (68%) and Türkiye (80%).

Perception of the world

Kazakhstan has skilfully navigated geopolitical changes to transform its relative isolation into a strategic advantage. By maintaining equidistance between Russia and Ukraine, it preserves ties with Russia, while avoiding overt alignment.

Kazakhstan does not implement sanctions against Russia and so it has to take care not to become a target of secondary (US) sanctions.

Kazakhstan is a member of several international organisations and served a second term on the UN Human Rights Council (2022–2024). Its foreign policy focuses on global nuclear disarmament and strengthening EU ties through the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. However, respondents show ambivalence towards international organisations, supporting a stronger UN (65%) and OSCE (50%), slightly higher than the poll average. They oppose a larger NATO role (50%), although younger respondents are less reluctant (18–29 years old: 33%). Half of respondents believe that international laws and rules are no longer relevant.

Kazakhs support a stronger UN and OSCE, but oppose a larger NATO role.

Kazakhstan’s pragmatic approach balances competing interests while capitalising on its geographic and political positioning. This applies particularly to China and Russia, two of its largest trading and investment partners. A notable majority of 62% support stronger cooperation with Russia, which is the second-highest level of support in the poll, similar to that of Serbia (64%). Closer cooperation with China (68%) and with the EU (51%) is also desired.

Respondents exhibit a mixed stance, with the lowest agreement that EU policies conflict with Kazakhstan's interests, but also the second-lowest support for a larger EU role (42%, tied with Serbia). EU High Representative Kaja Kallas reaffirmed support for Kazakhstan's reforms and strengthening EU ties. Only 37% favour closer ties with the US.

This strategic pluralism underscores Kazakhstan’s desire not to commit to a single bloc. Regarding preferred alignment, 70% support balanced relations between the West, Russia and China. Only 24% advocate aligning exclusively with two sides, namely Russia and China.

Kazakhstan leverages geopolitical momentum to assert its influence, but remains uncertain about how the emerging power dynamics will settle. Russia is perceived as emerging as a dominant power, while the EU is not regarded as becoming one. However, younger respondents see the EU as gaining influence and Russia as losing it. But regardless of age and power dynamics, 41% of Kazakh respondents see the country as vulnerable to a Russian attack. About 61% fear that future wars could directly affect Kazakhstan, but only 20% believe that a new world war is likely.Contradictory interests in relations between the US and Russia (66%), and between the US and China (57%) are widely recognised. About half fear a new Cold War. Aligning interests are perceived between the EU and the US (37%), and especially between Russia and China (53%). Kazakh respondents would prefer greater sovereignty in security matters.

Most Kazakhs would like the EU to become more independent of the US and lean towards more diplomacy. However, the EU appears to have limited salience in Kazakhstan as almost 40% replied ‘don’t know’ when asked who should lead EU security policy. Security threats to Europe they regard as emanating from the US (52%) rather than from Russia (29%) and China (22%). This contrasts with the polled EU countries, who perceive Russia to be the biggest threat.

Perceptions of the media are fairly evenly split, with 39% viewing reporting as objective and 38% seeing it as biased. Younger respondents are more likely to trust media objectivity.

Perception of the Russian war against Ukraine

70% support balanced relations between the West, Russia and China.

Kazakhstan's response to the war reflects a position of neutrality, maintaining good relations with both Russia and Ukraine. Accordingly, Kazakhs demonstrate a particular stance, differing from other respondents in the poll. For instance, blame for the war against Ukraine is attributed almost evenly to Russia (35%) and to Ukraine (30%). The US is seen as the primary aggressor, at 47% (although younger respondents attach far less blame to the US, at 26%). Only Serbs share this view. Some 40% view the war as a proxy war between Russia and the West, vying for global influence, ten points higher than the poll average.

Consistent with their preference for non-alignment, 35% answered ‘don’t know’ when asked whether support for Ukraine should continue. Kazakhs show strong opposition to third-party intervention in the war. Further support for Ukraine is limited (25%, 18–29 year-olds: 37%), and if so, mainly through humanitarian aid (38%). They strongly oppose sending more weapons or ground troops to support Ukraine. Among those rejecting further support (34%), the vast majority cite the necessity of ending the war. Kazakhstan’s role in helping Russia to circumvent Western sanctions is seen primarily as economically driven (29%). About a quarter replied ‘don’t know’ or cited attempts at independence from Western influence (22%).

Kazakhs express high support (42%) for resolving the conflict through diplomacy. One reason for that could also be the possibility of an enhanced role for their country. The president’s diplomatic experience and his good ties to China may allow Kazakhstan to play a constructive role in ending the war against Ukraine.

Kazakhs view Russia as strengthened by the war, while opinions on China are more mixed, with many seeing it as either strengthened or unchanged. Their own country is perceived as unchanged (53%), and least weakened (9%) in the poll. This aligns with respondents’ perceptions of the momentum of geopolitical change.

The way forward

Optimism about Kazakhstan's future is particularly pronounced and ranks among the highest in the poll. Respondents expect improvements for Kazakhstan (66%), the world (49%) and for Europe (46%). Younger respondents are particularly optimistic.

Foreign policy priorities focus on combating terrorism (59%), addressing human rights violations (43%), and managing geopolitical tensions (38%). Regarding climate change, about one-quarter are satisfied with the current policies of their own government, the EU and the international community of states. Among respondents under 30, however, Kazakhstan exhibits some of the highest values in the poll. Kazakhs emphasise the need for international cooperation and assistance from wealthier to poorer nations. Kazakhstan has significant potential in terms of critical raw materials, making it a sought-after partner. In this context, a majority prioritise securing borders and competing for natural resources in response to potential instability caused by climate change, reflecting a pragmatic view of national interests.

Kazakhs view diplomacy as the most effective means of promoting international peace. They show one of the highest approvals that their country should assume more international responsibility. Affected by Soviet nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk site in the Kazakh steppe, Kazakhstan voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons in 1992 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As a result, 77% oppose nuclear weapons, although younger respondents exhibit a slightly higher tolerance for their use.

Noticeable shifts in attitudes emerge among those aged between 18 and 29, driven by a more critical stance towards Russia. Younger Kazakhs see Russia as a greater threat to Europe (39%, overall: 29%), but still maintain a positive stance on cooperation with Russia. Younger people would be more willing to reduce dependency on Russia and China, even if this had a negative impact on living standards.

Younger Kazakhs have a more critical approach towards Russia but still maintain a positive stance on cooperation.
They show more interest in developing ties with the EU and the US. Their lower level of support for diplomatic efforts (40%, overall: 55%) and lower readiness to cooperate with non-like-minded states (58%, overall: 65%) may suggest a preference for a distinctive, more pro-European foreign policy course. This could significantly impact Kazakhstan's traditional balancing act.

Increasing the defence budget is supported by half of the population. Regarding future investments, around 68% of Kazakhs prioritise social and economic investments over military spending. As in other polled countries, the majority favour funding defence expenditure through a special levy on the rich.

About Security Radar 2025

Security Radar 2025 is a representative public opinion poll conducted in September 2024 among the resident populations in 14 countries: Germany, France, Georgia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Türkiye, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States.

Public opinion may have a substantial impact on political decision-makers facing security issues, particularly at a time of high tensions and major uncertainty. The aim of the Security Radar Survey Series is to track changes in public opinion regarding issues relating to foreign-, security, and defense policy. Prior editions of the Security Radar Survey Series have been published in 2019, 2022, and 2023.

The focus of the Security Radar 2025 is to explore changes in public opinion since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To this end, we compare two surveys: The first is the Security Radar 2022, conducted in 14 countries prior to the outbreak of the war in autumn 2021, and published at the Munich Security Conference just days before the invasion. The second is the present Security Radar 2025, conducted three year later. This allows us to compare people’s attitudes directly before the invasion with attitudes almost three years into the war. For four EU members – France, Germany, Latvia and Poland – we have three data points to compare (as these four countries featured in the follow-up Security Radar 2023, which explored changes in public attitudes nine months into the war, in autumn 2022).

About the Survey

By »Europe« we understand the space covered by the members of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In certain obvious cases, however, we use »Europe« interchangeably with »the EU«. When we use the term »the West«, we mean the EU together with the USA. The pollster Ipsos Public Affairs in Berlin was assigned to carry out the fieldwork in twelve of the fourteen countries; in Georgia, the fieldwork was carried out by Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC). In Russia, the fieldwork was conducted by an independent pollster, whose name we decided not to disclose because of the risk of criminal liability. The survey is based on the Security Radar 2023 questionnaire, adapted and extended in line with developments related to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Overall, we explore and compare public opinion on the current security and foreign policy situation in Europe, focusing on seven aspects:

perception of the current threat situation;
attitudes towards foreign and security policy;
attitudes towards international organisations;
attitudes towards national identity;
attitudes towards the EU, the United States, NATO, Russia and China;
perception of Russia’s war against Ukraine;
perception of climate change and its effects on security in Europe.

Polling during wartime

Conducting polls during wartime presents significant challenges, requiring cautious interpretation of the results. In Ukraine, ongoing hostilities in Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk regions prevented their inclusion in the sample, affecting the survey’s representativeness. The war has also altered Ukraine's demographics, with millions of people, particularly women, leaving the country and many men serving at the front.

Wartime conditions also increase the likelihood that people will provide what they perceive to be socially desirable responses, potentially skewing results. This may be especially the case in Russia, where repressive laws exacerbate this tendency. Despite these challenges, including Russia and Ukraine in the Security Radar survey remains crucial because of their significant roles in European security. The survey was last conducted in Russia and Ukraine in 2021, a few months before the full-scale invasion.

Data in Ukraine was gathered by Ipsos via online questionnaire. To gather data in Russia, an independent polling company was commissioned, although its identity is withheld to protect it from potential prosecution, given the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's »undesirable organisation« status in Russia. The poll was conducted via telephone, with a shortened questionnaire and some terms adapted to ensure respondents’ safety and from political considerations (for instance, the term »special military operation« was used instead of »Russia's war against Ukraine«).

These adaptations and precautions highlight the complexity of conducting polls in conflict zones and under restrictive regimes. While the data provides valuable insights, it's crucial to consider these limitations when interpreting the results, understanding that they offer a snapshot of public opinion under challenging circumstances rather than a comprehensive view.

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