Poland

Poles’ biggest concerns are inflation (91%), wars and conflicts (89%), economic crises (84%) and uncontrolled migration (81%).

Some 63% of respondents view Poland's prosperity as linked to the well-being of other countries. Having said that, 64% believe that Poland does not have the status it deserves, a similar number to Italy. This figure is significantly higher than in other polled European countries, such as Germany or France (around 40%), and emphasises Poland’s desire for greater recognition.

People’s personal situations improved slightly compared with 2022: the proportion of people expressing concerns decreased from 83% to 73%, and fears of economic decline dropped from 67% to 46%. Some 62% believe an era of wars and conflicts is emerging. A large majority fear they will affect Poland in the future.

Poland desires strong support for international institutions and robust transatlantic relations. The majority are open to a greater role for the UN, the OSCE and the EU, with NATO receiving the second-highest support in the poll (76%). Some 65% of those surveyed favour more collaboration with the EU. Even with the current pro-European course of the Tusk government, however, half of the respondents perceive their country to be regularly in conflict with the EU, a 10 percentage point increase since 2021. Poland's course of action within the EU should focus on strengthening its leadership (42%), the highest level of support among the surveyed countries, including Italy, Germany and France. A quarter advocate stronger European institutions, a figure notably lower than in Italy (40%) or Germany (37%).

Poland sees the US as a key partner, with 75% favouring more collaboration.

Poland sees the US as a key partner, prioritising security cooperation over calls for greater autonomy. A large majority of 75% favour more collaboration with the US. Just 15% of Poles favour increased cooperation with Russia, compared with 43% in relation to China. Correspondingly, the proportion of people desiring reduced dependence on Russia (73%) is much greater than with regard to China (46%). 

Poland’s priority remains countering Russian influence, while China is viewed more favourably but still with some caution. 

Perceptions of media reporting have become more balanced, with the same proportions viewing it as objective and as non-objective (43%). Younger people are more likely to perceive reporting as biased.
 

A broad majority in Poland believe that ending the war against Ukraine is a prerequisite for improving security in Europe. Russia is seen as the primary threat for Europe (82%), followed by China (44%). 
Concerning Russia, there is a keen awareness of potential conflict. Poland views EU and NATO enlargement as a potential threat to European security (44%). This concern is not significantly higher than in EU countries farther from the eastern flank. Support for a European Army has increased (from 49% in 2022 to 54%). Some 57% still support ensuring peace through non-military means, a 10-point drop compared with 2021. This shift highlights the growing trend towards militarisation.

Poland envisions the EU becoming an active security actor, focusing on regional stability and strong partners. Polish respondents show the lowest support in the poll for becoming increasingly independent of the US in security affairs. Tusk announced an improvement in relations with Germany, and 63% of those surveyed support this. Poland is also improving relations with France, as the three countries resumed the Weimar Triangle format. 
Some 42% of Poles prefer the trio as leaders in EU security compared with 24% for sole Polish leadership. 

63% think Poland should improve relations with Germany. 42% want the Weimar Triangle to lead the EU, more than in any other country.

In the event of a Russian attack, only 31% believe Poland can properly defend itself. Over half (56%) see the EU as unable to defend itself without the US. Younger respondents are more confident, showing greater resolve and trust in EU defence capabilities.

War fatigue has set in Poland, with the focus shifting to national interests.

War fatigue has set in Poland, especially among younger respondents, with the focus shifting to national interests. Although Polish support for Ukraine remains robust within the EU and NATO, public support for Ukraine is declining. Some 35% back Ukraine until victory, 30% support neutrality and 29% favour diplomacy. Support for Ukraine's membership of the NATO (47%) and EU (45%) has also declined since 2022. Nonetheless, Poles see their country as strengthened by the war (34%).

Russia is clearly identified as the aggressor by 81%, although the share of people putting the blame on Ukraine has doubled since 2022 (from 8% to 16%). Asked for the reasons behind the Russian invasion, some 40% cite Russian imperialism, the second-highest figure in the poll after Ukraine. Consequently, 63% view it as territorial expansion (and not as a proxy war or contest between democracies and autocracies). 

Opinion on continuing support is split, with war fatigue contributing to a decline. Only about half of Polish respondents, in line with the average of other polled NATO countries, support continued aid to Ukraine. Support is still desired mainly through military means (63%). The wish to send Polish troops has decreased from 21% in 2022 to 15% in 2024. This highlights a growing division on how to balance support with the risk of escalation. There is no majority for more weapon deliveries, although discussions are progressing between Poland and Ukraine on joint arms production. However, only 39% would continue support if the US or Germany stopped their aid. Among the 30% who decline further support for Ukraine, most respondents say it is too expensive (45%, the highest percentage in the poll). Another 36% just want the war to end. 

The highest share (42%) believe it is most important to end the war even at the cost of territorial losses for Ukraine, while 30% favour restoring territorial integrity. 

The 16% who prioritise Russia losing the war, even at the risk of escalation, is similar to the figure in Sweden and relatively high in the poll. However, many expect the war to end with a diplomatic solution (34%) or not at all (35%). 
Poland has become a major destination for Ukrainian war refugees, but less than 40% see added value in their presence. Support among the younger generations is even lower. Additionally, 81% wish to protect Polish farmers, particularly on issues related to grain.

Despite a bleak outlook for the next five years, Polish respondents are slightly more optimistic than the poll average. About a fifth expect improvements. A strong majority support an active foreign policy for Poland. Some 62% back the promotion of values abroad, in marked contrast to Germany (25%). However, only 40% want Poland to take more international responsibility if there are no direct benefits.

Regarding climate change, respondents are largely dissatisfied with current measures. They are most satisfied with EU policies among all respondents to the poll. While 46% support all possible measures to combat climate change, 36% emphasise adaptation. Climate change is seen as a global challenge for peace and security (59%). However, 64% think Poland should prioritise securing its borders and competing for natural resources in the global market.

Poland’s foreign policy focuses on security, but reluctance towards military interventions is growing. Foreign policy priorities include combating terrorism and extremism (58%), addressing human rights violations (41%, 48% women and 34% men), and managing geopolitical tensions (40%). There is also a focus on improving defence capabilities (43%). Strengthening international institutions and intensifying diplomatic efforts have less support. Diplomatic measures are considered the most effective (56%), followed by economic measures (49%) and then military action (42%). Military actions are viewed as the least legitimate by 30% of respondents. However, Poland has one of the highest approval ratings (39%, an increase on previous years) for pursuing military intervention in conflicts, alongside the US, Türkiye and Sweden. 

Current defence spending for 2024 is 4.2% of GDP, projected to rise to 4.7% in 2025. Our survey reflects that 75% favour higher military spending, with approval increasing in recent years (2021: 53%, 2022: 69%). While 44% prioritise social and economic spending, 38% favour military spending, the highest share in the poll after Ukraine. Higher military spending should be financed by cuts in other budgets such as social spending (remarkable 38%, the highest figure in the poll) or a special levy on the rich (34%). Poland advocates higher military spending, but considers financing Ukraine to be rather costly. This has led the country to prioritise its own defence, with the goal of asserting military leadership in Europe.

With 39%, Poland has one of the highest approval ratings for pursuing military intervention in conflicts.