France

The biggest concerns of French respondents are inflation and the rising cost of living (86%), economic crises (81%), and the impact of wars and conflicts (78%). A large majority (80%) feel safe in their immediate surroundings, but this is slightly below the average in the poll, probably because of recent riots and violent disturbances, as well as terrorist attacks in recent years. Although fears of a worsening personal economic situation have declined, the majority are concerned about their personal future (2022: 71%; 2024: 58%). 
Perceptions of France's global standing have hardly shifted. Some 41% believe the country doesn't receive the status it deserves (2021: 45%). Still, the French are among the least dissatisfied with their country's status in our poll.

French public opinion underscores the significance of multilateralism in global governance. France supports a greater UN role (60%), although this has declined slightly (2021: 64%). Public sentiment mirrors the French government's rather reserved stance towards NATO, with 48% supporting a greater role and 26% opposing it.

The French believe that the coming era will be marked by a »my country first« mentality (73%), although this is less pronounced among those under 40. A substantial 57% believe that laws and rules in international relations are no longer relevant, significantly more than in other polled European countries, such as Germany or Poland (both around 35%). Opinions about the likelihood of a new world war are split, with most people saying ‘don’t know’ (40%) or ‘yes’ (31%).

57% of the French believe that laws and rules in international relations are no longer relevant, significantly more than in Germany or Poland. 

French public opinion reflects a shift towards multipolarity. The French do believe the era of American supremacy is rather over (47%). While 44% still favour increased cooperation with the US, a notable 39% oppose it. A growing role for middle powers, such as Brazil or Türkiye, is expected by 45%, and 38% view Russia as a potential leader of the countries outside the »West«. Only a third view the EU as a global power. Nonetheless, the majority support a larger role for the EU, with opinion divided on the extent of France’s disagreement with the EU. French respondents reject greater cooperation with Russia (65%) and China (54%), coupled with a desire for reduced dependence (67% for Russia, 62% for China).

44% of the French favour increased cooperation with the US, but 39% oppose it.

The strengthening of alignment between the USA and the EU is evident from the French perspective, with the perceived divergence of interests at 29%. In contrast, the perceived divergence between the US and Russia (60%) or China (56%) remains higher than that between the EU and Russia (55%) or China (49%). These perceptions suggest that the US is positioned within a more complex and tension-filled geopolitical context than the EU.

Over 50% of French people do not find media coverage objective, consistent with previous years. This perception may be driven by the fact that the media landscape is owned by a small group of billionaires.

A large majority in France see an era of wars and conflicts emerging, with 74% seeing Russia as a threat for Europe and 43% China. The US is viewed as a threat for European security by 23%.
A majority, as in other polled countries, view ending the war against Ukraine as key to improving European security. About half see the EU as unable to defend itself without the US. An overwhelming majority of 78% see France as vulnerable in case of a Russian attack. This is the highest figure in the poll, despite France's history as a military power and its battle-tested deployments. Disillusionment with interventionism is growing, with opposition to military interventions increasing from 37% in 2021 to 61% in 2024. Also, military interventions are perceived as less effective (2021: 50%, 2024: 41%) and less legitimate (2021: 48%, 2024: 37%). 

Reflecting Macron’s (futile) efforts to promote European strategic autonomy, France shows the highest support among European countries for an EU Army (56%). Paris advocates a unified EU foreign policy and a European Defence Fund. This position helps to explain its desire to become more independent of the US, with 64% in support, slightly higher than the average across the surveyed EU countries. Still, almost half believe that defence should be handled nationally.

Asked about a potential leader in EU security, 29% name France either alone or as part of the revived Weimar triangle, together with Germany and Poland. While France and Germany's cooperation remains key, differences in defence, trade and energy policies are growing. In any case, France is nearly equally divided on its future role in the EU: 32% favour promoting stronger European institutions, 27% support taking stronger EU leadership, while 27% favour focusing on national interests. Divergent EU priorities are emerging, with Germany envisioning a similar role, Poland seeking a more prominent leadership position, and Italy focusing on strengthening European institutions.
 

In France, 72% of respondents identify Russia as the primary aggressor in the war. Regarding motives for Russia’s invasion, 32% attribute it to Russia’s imperialist ambitions, while 27% cite the long-standing tensions with Ukraine. 

Concerning France's stance, the highest share (37%) favours diplomatic efforts, despite Macron’s unsuccessful efforts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine. Some 28% back supporting Ukraine until victory, with stronger support among older respondents. 

Opposition to military interventions increased from 37% in 2021 to 61% in 2024. But France shows the highest support among European countries for an EU Army.

The gap between the desired outcome and its perceived feasibility is highlighted, as only 5% of respondents anticipate a military victory for Ukraine. 

Overall, about half favour continued support for Ukraine. Among those, 53% back military and 22% humanitarian aid. Among those opposed to further aid, 48% believe the war must end, and 38% claim that it’s too expensive, the second-highest share after Poland. A majority would welcome more sanctions, while only around a third support increased weapon deliveries, a notable decline (2022: 40%).

Macron’s suggestion of deploying ground troops in Ukraine faced widespread criticism, as reflected in our survey, with only 14% in favour. French opinion on possible EU and NATO membership for Ukraine is mixed, but rather negative. This stance became apparent as early as 2008, when Merkel and Sarkozy opposed Ukraine's Membership Action Plan at the NATO Bucharest summit, leading to the alliance's decision to withhold support for Ukraine's NATO membership. This historical position is now intertwined with war fatigue. The French are neither as strong supporters as the Latvians or Swedes, nor as opposed as the Italians. Support exists, similar to that in Germany, but it remains cautious and has waned compared with the 2022 survey.

As for the broader effects of the war, French respondents largely view it as aimed at expanding Russia’s territory, slightly higher than the average of polled NATO countries. As a result of the war, the US, China and NATO are perceived as stable. Russia and the EU are regarded as having diminished influence. France is viewed as marginally weaker.