2026: Will Europe still be lost in geopolitics?

Alexandra Dienes

Across Europe, public support has grown for higher defence spending in the shadow of Russian aggression and doubts about President Trump’s commitment to European security. In 2026, discussions will focus on how Europe can strengthen its security by investing in concrete capabilities and more coherent coordination among European armies, and of course by maintaining its support for Ukraine. But these priorities face an inevitable constraint: limited fiscal space and competing demand from the social sector, which has been the foundation of prosperity and stability in Europe since 1945.

Our Security Radar 2025 shows a clear spending dilemma. While citizens acknowledge the need for stronger defence, when faced with a choice they prefer to invest in social resilience through health care, education and welfare. With stagnant budgets and populists on the rise, Europe cannot afford a »guns versus butter« trade-off. Security and prosperity are interdependent: a society that is cohesive, economically stable and technologically advanced is also one that can really defend itself. This calls for a broader understanding of security, one that echoes the OSCE’s approach, in which stability rests not only on armaments and defence alliances but on functioning infrastructure, a healthy economy, information integrity, democratic governance and social cohesion. Social spending and defence spending are not contradictory, but rather different sides of the same coin. 

Policy should therefore move beyond framing defence as traditional military spending towards a concept of »comprehensive security«. This includes safeguarding critical infrastructure, bolstering energy and cyber resilience as well as enhancing education and social systems. 

A broader debate about security is also needed when it comes to citizen involvement. Instead of focusing only on how to recruit enough soldiers for our armies, a »European Security Service«, a broader form of public engagement in which citizens contribute to security in various domains, would be a step in the right direction. Some would serve in the military, others would strengthen digital networks, protect critical infrastructure, develop cutting-edge defence technologies or work on education and societal resilience. Such an approach would resolve the dilemma between defence and social affairs and resonate especially in more »pacifist« societies sceptical of general conscription. It could form a strong European bond of solidarity. The coming year will test whether Europe can match its growing resolve with a comprehensive and sustainable security model.

Margarete Lengger

In 2025, Europe was lost in geopolitics. The ensuing struggle to identify friends and foes; who to defend against and to what extent; has re-entered election campaigns and voter motivations. Public positioning on Russia’s war on Ukraine, as well as concerns about defence budgets have significantly influenced several elections across Europe, most prominently Germany’s national elections and Poland’s presidential elections. When governments push hard on defence budgets, something moves in the electorate. Our Security Radar focussed on gender highlights where that movement is likely to occur, and which groups may primarily feel left behind.

We can already observe that socio-economic vulnerability strongly shapes attitudes towards defence and security spending. Low-to-no-income men and women in mid-life, in particular, would prefer that public funds be spent on social and economic needs rather than defence. Part-time workers and the unemployed, among whom women are overrepresented, are also less keen on expanding military budgets. 

Generational divides add another layer of complexity to the threat-specific priorities of different groups. While women worry more, speaking overall, this gender worry gap is narrower among young adults (18–29 years old) than among mid-life adults (50–59 years old). However, younger people exhibit growing polarisation with regard to their concerns about specific global challenges: Women remain more concerned about climate change and wars, whereas men worry more about uncontrolled immigration. 

These patterns underline a crucial point for 2026: increases in defence spending are capable of exacerbating existing real and perceived inequalities. When spending is diverted from education, health care, housing or other areas that directly affect people’s lives, the accompanying threat of deeper inequalities risks leaving democratic societies more fragile than before.

It is democracy itself – robust institutions, public participation, access to reliable information, and the protection of social cohesion – that is most under attack from authoritarian forces and that ultimately will be required to sustain security. Policies that integrate socio-economic realities, gender differences and generational perspectives – meaning that they prioritise democratic stability alongside military and social considerations – are not only more equitable, but more effective in building security that the population genuinely supports. European resilience, in short, depends on inclusiveness, and on recognising that the road to security runs not just through expanded weaponry, but through the full spectrum of the people it aims to protect. For 2026, how governments communicate and implement this insight will decide whether and when Europe regains its footing and secures both democratic legitimacy and the continent’s long-term security.

Christos Katsioulis

The lack of magic money trees in Europe is also at the heart of the challenge to support Ukraine facing European governments in 2026. The financial needs of Ukraine will only grow more intense in the coming months. With President Trump in the White House, the United States have not only stopped sending financial aid to Kyiv, but at the same time have demanded that the Europeans cover the bill for their military support. That puts an additional strain on already groaning budgets: governments will need to explain why they are sending funds to Ukraine while schools and hospitals at home are crumbling. 

In most European countries we surveyed for Security Radar 2025, support for Ukraine is more or less contested. With our division of the surveyed into five different groups we were able to show the available political leeway. Two groups are fairly stable in their beliefs, namely the »Determined«, standing firmly on Ukraine’s side, and on the opposite side the much smaller group of »Russia’s friends«, who support the halting of aid to Ukraine and closer relations with Russia. The first group’s support needs to be maintained, while the second is probably out of reach. 

The most promising part of society in this respect is the wobbly political middle. Situated between the two aforementioned groups, this centre offers political scope for reshaping. We named the two groups the »Reluctant« and the »Unaffiliated«, and their motives and sensibilities differ substantially. While the »Determined« may rely on moral arguments and solidarity with Ukraine, the »Reluctant« – who oppose stronger cooperation with Russia, but equally oppose more weapons for Ukraine – might respond to feelings of insecurity and a wish to be safe. The »Unaffiliated« – who take no position on either question – may realise that, in fact, they cannot afford to remain unaffiliated, unless they accept that their lives may be negatively affected. 

These different motives are yet to be taken up in a narrative that links support for Ukraine and investment in European defence with something people actually care about. A political strategy galvanising European public support for Ukraine thus needs to focus on four issues to which these groups are open, especially in Italy, France, Germany and Poland: first, the defence of Ukraine as a way to strengthen international law; second, prospects of a diplomatic solution of the conflict; third, common European defence efforts to alleviate the sense of insecurity; and fourth – and related to that – a step by step strategy to become more independent from the US, which most voters support.

Sabrina Kaschowitz & Alexandra Dienes

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 reinforced trends that run athwart EU efforts to build up a »ring of friends« around itself. The resurgence of power politics has highlighted the EU’s disadvantage as a foreign policy actor, especially because it is not a military power. The fact that the EU is unable to agree on a common approach towards its neighbourhood or even speak with one voice makes things worse. However, the EU's economic, regulatory and normative power remains its key strength. The EU can continue to capitalise on this to retain influence and have a positive impact in the neighbourhood in 2026 and beyond.

In our papers on South Caucasus and Central Asia (forthcoming in January 2026), we suggest that regional cooperation can make both regions more stable and better connected to Europe. This is highly relevant as Europe looks for partners and routes that may increase its resilience in the future.

One key focus is connectivity: the EU can contribute by investing in economic links, primarily the Middle Corridor, a trade route connecting China to Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The Middle Corridor is projected to enhance trade and cooperation between countries along the route, boost economic activity, create opportunities for local businesses and generate jobs. Here, the EU as an economic bloc and regulatory superpower is well placed to assist in regional cooperation and act as a vehicle of economic development and stability in the region. It can, for example, help to harmonise practices to lower transaction costs for shippers, promote unified tariffs or support a single payment platform, while anchoring European standards with strong labour and environmental protection (in contrast to Chinese standards).

A second promising option concerns environmental and water cooperation. The limits of the EU’s geopolitical weight also highlight how much Europe can matter when it acts as a pragmatic and technically skilled partner. In both regions, the EU’s expertise is sought in environmental cooperation, particularly cross-border water management. If delivered in a depoliticised way, with local ownership and a focus on environmental and social needs rather than on securing resources, such cooperation can help to ease tensions over environmental resources, reduce the securitisation of climate change and gradually rebuild the EU’s credibility in regions with growing agency. In 2026, when climate stress and resource competition are likely to increase, this kind of practical, problem-solving approach will test whether the EU can turn its technical and normative strengths into visible benefits in its neighbourhood.

Sabrina Kaschowitz

Inside Europe, the hard truth will be revealed over the coming years that there are no magic solutions to shield societies from the mounting costs of climate change. Nevertheless, the political imagination still treats climate impacts as somehow distant, primarily affecting »other« regions. This illusion persists even though rising temperatures, persistent droughts and diminishing water resources are already affecting Europe directly. Climate effects are also deepening inequalities, increasing low-level crime and violence, straining economic stability, and eroding trust in institutions. All of these factors are gradually altering Europe’s social and political landscape. 

Despite all this, climate change is increasingly being marginalised on political agendas, pushed aside by more immediate crises, driven by the desperate hope that Europe will somehow avoid the worst. Our recent report A distant problem no longer – How climate change is fuelling crime and fraying trust across Europe leaves no room for doubt, however. Besides infrastructural resilience, societal cohesion is at risk. As climate impacts increasingly spill over into Europe’s social sphere, they will create ideal conditions for the wilful spread of disinformation by anti-democratic actors, domestic and foreign. Their narratives take root fastest where people already feel ignored, whether in struggling rural regions or in communities unsettled by extreme weather events. 

These issues will demand more political attention in 2026 and beyond. If Europe wants to weather the coming storm, it must acknowledge what has already passed its doorstep: climate change is now a European security and social challenge. Fighting disinformation and strengthening societal cohesion are indispensable for effective climate change adaptation.

Simon Weiß

Understanding how Russia’s military has evolved since it invaded Ukraine remains one of the key challenges of European security policy. It is essential that European decision-makers are able to assess Russia’s capabilities without falling prey to either hyperbole or wishful thinking. Europe needs to find a stable approach to dealing with a confrontational Russia. This entails, on one hand, a judicious strengthening of defence capacities without eroding the social fabric or feeding a destructive arms-race. On the other hand, channels are needed to communicate military risks and avoid escalation. Public opinion still oscillates between belittling and, more frequently, overestimating Russia. We looked at these developments in a closed expert’s workshop in late November 2025 to gain insights for the upcoming challenges in 2026. 

A sober assessment of Russia’s regenerative capabilities shows a mixed picture. The Russian military continues to operate under significant constraints, while simultaneously learning and adjusting under wartime pressure. Russia’s core difficulties lie in logistics and the technological contest with both Ukraine and the West. Its military leadership culture is changing slowly and inconsistently, and corruption continues to undermine institutional efficiency. Structural weaknesses beset the Russian war effort, from strained supply lines to personnel shortfalls and a persistent lack of high-end technological components.

At the same time, Russia has adapted more quickly and comprehensively than many analysts expected after its botched opening campaign in 2022. It has adjusted recruitment practices, expanded drone production across all categories, increased ammunition output, modernised selected systems and diversified procurement on global markets to keep its defence industry functioning. Industrial plants operate around the clock in multi-shift operations, but even so shortages of key components persist. As a consequence, technologically sophisticated weapons that play a minor role in the current attrition have been delayed or suspended.

Focusing on the military’s infrastructural backbone, Russia’s railway network remains indispensable for sustaining the war, even though decades of underinvestment, insufficient staffing and vulnerability to sabotage continue to hamper its reliability. Despite these problems, both the military railway troops and the civilian rail sector have managed to keep freight and troops on the move, although relying on Belarussian support. 

It is essential that Europe keep a vigilant eye on what is happening in Russia. Europe’s main vulnerabilities lie not so much in Russian strength compared with European capabilities (as the NSS 2025 interestingly and correctly states), but in its own political fragmentation, obdurate dependence on the United States, divergent national armament logics and lack of coherence in NATO/EU strategy. 

Europe must therefore closely monitor Russia’s war economy and the evolution of its defence-industrial base, paying particular attention to unmanned systems and the expansion of low-cost mass production. At the same time, force posture, military activity along NATO’s borders, and the dynamics of escalation need to be considered, while efforts should be prepared to revive meaningful arms-control discussions.

Christos Katsioulis

There was no Nobel Peace Prize for Donald Trump in 2025. He has not kept his promise to bring peace to Ukraine, whether in 24 hours or 100 days. That is scarcely surprising, as this war is part of a broader and more complex conflict. Our Peace Matrix illustrates the different levels of collision between Russia and Ukraine, Europe (not only the EU) and Russia, as well as the US and Russia, and how they are intertwined with each other. It is obvious at a glance that any effort to stop the war against Ukraine needs to address all three of these levels in parallel and in a coordinated manner. The last Russian-American proposal presented in November 2025 exemplifies the shortcomings of an approach that underestimates the complexity. The key to successful management of the situation is the active involvement of all parts of the equation. The Europe-shaped hole in the Witkoff-Dmitrieff plan might be politically motivated, given the disdain of both Putin and Trump for Europe. But this makes their »solution« both unsustainable and prone to obstruction by the »Old« continent they dislike so much. 

However, it is not down to the White House and the Kremlin alone that Europe has been sitting on the side-lines in these peace efforts. The questions that immediately came up when we discussed the Peace Matrix were »Who is speaking for Europe?« and »What are the European positions when it comes to, let’s say, sanctions relief, security guarantees for Ukraine, or diplomatic channels with Russia?« 

Europe’s remarkable unity in response to Russian aggression is based on reaction rather than action. This has galvanised the rather diverse group of states and enabled strong sanction packages, as well as continued support for Ukraine under US leadership while Biden was still President. The new resident in the White House has a different agenda, however, focused on »deals« with Russia in pursuit of economic gains, and shrugging off the unwelcome financial burden of Ukrainian defence. These are also the leitmotifs of his »peace ideas«. If 2026 turns out to be the year the Russian war finally ends, Europe needs to get its act together and formulate its own plan for stabilising security on the Old continent. It needs not least to give full weight to the many and strong levers Europe has at its disposal against Russia, as well as the current situation on the battlefield. If a coalition of the willing spanning the different blocs in Europe can come up with such a plan (and do so quickly), the next year might indeed see some desperately needed progress for peace in Europe. If a Nobel Peace Prize 2026 for a European Peace Coalition involving Donald Trump is the result, that would be the cherry on the cake.