A brief stocktake of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, carried out just a few weeks before it enters its third year, is a fairly bleak exercise. The good news is that none of Russia’s war aims have been achieved. Ukraine has lost control of parts of its territory, but its sovereignty remains intact. Support for Ukraine’s defence with arms supplies and financial aid will continue. Russia’s war has been condemned by a clear majority of states even in the UN General Assembly.

The bad news is that, despite all of the above, the war goes on. Russia continues to attack Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, with continued loss of life among both soldiers and civilians. The battlefield dynamics, having changed several times in the past two years, reveal a disquieting trend. After the rather underwhelming results of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in 2023, the Russian army is on the offensive once more, pushing Ukraine into another phase of attrition. In the coming weeks and months,
Ukrainian forces will have to focus on defending the current frontline. Further territorial liberations are less likely. Russia, on the other hand, will be trying to gain more territory. In the war of attrition, resources such as soldiers and weapons are key, and unfortunately, Russia currently seems to have an advantage in both. It looks as though the dynamic phase of the war might be over and changes in frontlines will soon be measured in metres rather than kilometres.

Few headlines to come

Ukraine is facing a tough third year of war. As its defence hinges upon continued Western weapons supplies and financial aid, Ukraine’s hardest task will be to sustain the West’s attention and support. Wars of attrition generate few headlines. Today many Europeans do not regard the war in Ukraine as the most significant crisis, compared with the climate crisis or migration. Prospects are likely even worse in the United States. The war in the Middle East requires US attention and resources and the likely Republican candidate Donald Trump doesn’t inspire confidence regarding continued US engagement for Ukraine. These domestic cleavages have already affected the supply stream by putting further aid packages to Ukraine on hold.

With a number of important elections approaching in the United States, the United Kingdom and the EU, doubts over the reliability and sustainability of support for Kyiv are likely to intensify in 2024. The Russian presidential election in March will probably have the adverse effect of solidifying public support for Putin and his course of action. The main signal that may emanate from these elections – regardless of the fact that some will be a lot fairer and more competitive than others – could be one of Western indecisiveness versus Russian resolve.

To avert this scenario, the West needs a strategy. First, support for Ukraine should be based on long-term commitments. The decision of EU heads of state to secure €50 billion for Ukraine for the next two years is the right step. A similar approach should be applied to arms deliveries, focussing on such priority needs as ammunition and air defence. Second, in a democracy some sort of broad social consensus is required to conduct foreign policy successfully. Hence, communicating these efforts and their broader strategic necessity to European citizens is an urgent task. Helping Ukraine to prevail against Russia goes hand in hand with defence of Europe’s basic security tenets and is in the interests of us all. The fact that a majority believe that the EU has done a fairly good job of handling this crisis bodes well for continued mobilisation of public support. But it also entails an expectation that this record will be maintained.

The success of such an approach will not automatically end the war and restore peace in Europe. Nevertheless, a clear European signal to Russia that, even if US support might be fading, continuing to attack Ukraine is futile, seems to be the only possible path towards the negotiating table.