No one said the art of the deal would be good art

Right out of the gate the Trump administration unleashed a blizzard of announcements, executive orders, threats and other initiatives. The final shape of US policy on Ukraine, however, remains unclear. Apart from the campaign pledge to end the war rapidly, only vague comments have been heard in recent days along the lines of »a lot of sensitive conversations [are] going on«. A positive spin on this might be that it’s not the best idea to try to negotiate in the full glare of publicity. It may also indicate that views within the Ukraine support coalition, in the United States and even within the Republican party itself vary widely. The latest edition of the Security Radar lays these divisions bare.

The survey on Russia’s war against Ukraine

Five different groups are discernible with regard to the war in Ukraine, across all the countries we sampled. First, there are the Determined, who want to continue supporting the invaded nation and are opposed to cooperation with Russia. Second, we have the Reluctant: they also oppose cooperation with Russia, but at the same time oppose continuing the support for Ukraine. A third group comprises Russia’s friends, who in contrast with the first two would like to cooperate with Russia, besides opposing aid for Ukraine. Fourth, there are the Opportunists, a smaller group who seem to want to profit as much as possible from the current situation, cooperating more closely with Russia but at the same time supporting Ukraine. Finally, the fifth group comprises the non-affiliated, respondents who didn’t express an opinion on these issues. The composition of these groups differs in the various countries included in Security Radar 2025. This at least partly explains the different approaches to this war, as well as the diverse ways in which national policies are legitimised.

In the United States in particular the five groups are split: the Determined account for 25.7%, followed by the non-aligned on 25.5%, the Reluctant on 19.9%, the Opportunists on 15.4 % and Russia’s friends on 13.6%. The picture is slightly different inside the Republican Party: 28.1% of Republicans can be labelled Reluctant, 20.1% non-affiliated and 19.2% Determined, while as many as  17.9% can be characterised as Russia’s friends and 14.8% as Opportunists.

The apparent lack of cohesion on this topic poses a problem for the Trump White House. While there are slim majorities against both more weapons for Ukraine and cooperation with Russia, the other two groups still represent a significant proportion of Trumps electoral coalition. Silence on the matter of Ukraine thus serves the purpose of not upsetting any group in particular before the White House finally commits itself. This approach may also help to hold Trump’s rather heterogeneous cabinet together, given the difficulty of finding a common denominator on Ukraine between, for example, Marco Rubio, Tim Hegseth and Tulsi Gabbard.

Working behind the scenes would also be the best way to avoid differences with partners inside the Ukraine support coalition. As we show in the Security Radar, the various profiles of the main partners in terms of the five groups we identified translate into different policies regarding Ukraine.

The art of the deal is not the art of diplomacy

This perhaps illustrates one of the problems with applying Trump’s deal-making approach to peace-making in Ukraine. Some factions or partners are bound to oppose the process. There is no way to consider all priorities because they are contradictory. Some sort of rapid success in launching the negotiation process would help enormously in bridging the gaps, accompanied by some agreement on a long-term goal. An end to the fighting would be a start; a sovereign state of Ukraine would be the continuation; and the re-establishment of international law in Europe, resulting in a stable security order, would be the ultimate aim.