Institutional resilience is NATO’s real superpower

Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO appears to be stronger than ever. Indeed, it’s much more robust than its public image seems to indicate. Finland and Sweden have joined the Alliance; Russia has effectively been deterred from attacking NATO territory; European defence spending is rising; and the organisation has demonstrated a remarkable capacity for institutional adaptation. The principal threat posed by Russia is being contained both militarily and politically by a strong, well-functioning institution that has proven highly effective. Nevertheless, the uncertainty that characterises US reliability under Donald Trump has planted a seed of fear in the Alliance, which is undergoing a significant stress test.

The paradox is that while the Alliance is more united than at any time since the end of the Cold War in the face of its main adversary Russia, the greatest challenge to its cohesion emanates not from this threat, but from political volatility within the transatlantic relationship itself. Trump’s openly transactional approach to security, his repeated questioning of Article 5 and pressure on Europe – his hostile demands concerning the acquisition of Greenland and aggressive requests for help in the war on Iran being the latest cases in point – have accelerated debates about a more »European NATO«. This includes such proposals as former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen’s pitch of a D7-alliance. Projecting self-confidence and the ability to shape European security is difficult in these circumstances. And the less self-confidence Europe projects, the less interest the Americans have in it. After all, Trump likes winners. Right now, we’re in a downward spiral. But this is not inevitable.

Such debates go to the core of NATO’s famous statement of purpose »to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down«, as set out by its first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, in 1952. Some 75 years later, the organisation is resilient enough to weather another three years of home-made crisis without losing functionality or fragmenting, as long as it manages to project strength in two crucial ways.

First, by telling a narrative of strength, calm and self-confidence. Public debates in many member states, especially Germany, continue to revolve around military spending targets, deterrence and fears of escalation. These alarmist national discourses create the impression of an alliance permanently under pressure and constantly beset by worst‑case scenarios. The fact is that NATO’s real institutional capabilities and military posture are far more robust than this implies. In critical contact zones with Russia, the Alliance has demonstrated high levels of readiness and agility, whether it be the swift and confident escorting of Russian military aircraft out of Baltic airspace or the interception of intruding drones. As an organisation, the Alliance has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to absorb crises, adapt strategically and preserve unity despite major political disagreements. 

This resilience is rooted in NATO’s institutional setup and history. Over more than 75 years, it has built robust mechanisms for consensus‑building, military coordination and strategic adaptation. NATO survived the end of the Cold War, disagreements over Iraq and Afghanistan and recurring burden‑sharing disputes, not to mention – at least to date – President Trump. A more confident narrative from NATO and its member states could help to stabilise public discourse and avoid cycles of panic‑driven policymaking.

Second, NATO can project strength by moving beyond a largely reactive approach towards Russia. It can do so by developing a strategy that encompasses deterrence, but also stabilisers to shape European security in the future. NATO excels at deterrence by denial, force posture adaptation and military reinforcement along its eastern flank. But deterrence alone is a dangerous long‑term political framework for European security. Responses remain largely reactive, calibrated to Moscow’s latest provocations rather than to a broader, forward‑looking strategy.

NATO needs a clear political strategy towards Russia, building on and expanding point 9 of the 2022 Strategic Concept. It must combine credible deterrence with a calibrated, de‑escalatory communication strategy and conflict‑prevention tools. Such a strategy should also include a reliable dialogue structure between senior military officials on both sides, to help manage risks of escalation and unintended conflict.

NATO’s greatest strength today is not merely military power, but institutional resilience. The real challenge for the next decade is for the Alliance to turn that resilience into a proactive, politically sustainable vision for European security and finally to develop a genuine political strategy on Russia, rather than remain trapped in a default reactive posture. That is what we need for the decades to come.