Europe in Waiting – Opportunism as the New Foreign Policy

The war in Ukraine is sometimes framed as a clash of different worldviews: autocratic Russia on one side over against the rules-based West on the other. But this narrative obscures a more uncomfortable reality. What we are witnessing is less a contest of grand strategies than the quiet ascendency of opportunism, across the board. The basic approach is fairly clear: keep your options open, seize opportunities, minimise risks and avoid binding commitments. In a volatile and politically polarised world, that seems perfectly prudent. But it comes at the cost of credibility.

Moscow – doubling down after an initial blunder

Those who like to portray Putin as a kind of dark overlord, an imperial grand strategist planning every move three steps in advance, overlook a crucial fact. The invasion of 2022 was not the inexorable execution of a carefully calibrated long-term design, but a high-risk gamble aimed at swift political gains. And it was based on a profound miscalculation. Opportunism and adaptation have continued to define Russian policy. Moscow is relying on attrition, incremental gains on the battlefield and the possibility of future negotiation windows. Military pressure is maintained at a level sufficient to keep things in motion, while diplomatic channels are just about kept open. Russia’s war aims remain deliberately vague in order to retain a certain room for manoeuvre for whenever opportunity might present itself. It may be that Western unity will fail. Perhaps political majorities will shift. And perhaps President Trump will throw Ukraine under the bus. But this is less a sign of strategic mastery than of structural constraints. As long as other players hesitate, however, it will work.

Kyiv – the passage of time may present better opportunities

Ukraine is also forced to be somewhat opportunistic. The Russian attack compels it to try to preserve its sovereignty. Kyiv therefore views time as a strategic variable. The underlying hope or expectation is that conditions may improve. Russia remains under economic strain, political change in Moscow cannot be ruled out and it seems reasonable to assume that Western support will be sustained. Military innovation, economic pressure and potential shifts within the Russian system are all seen as ways in which Ukraine's bargaining position may strengthen.

This is neither irrational nor passive. For a country trying to defend itself, it is a rational choice to try to improve its leverage before entering serious negotiations. As long as the battlefield situation and Western support remain fluid, defining a detailed settlement framework would risk locking Ukraine into compromises from a position of weakness. The current strategy therefore focuses less on outlining a concrete peace formula and more on shaping conditions under which future negotiations might produce a more favourable outcome.

EU – symbolic commitments and unclear allegiances

The opportunistic mindset is most visible, but least fathomable in the European Union. The rhetorical aims are clear, including strategic autonomy and a more geopolitical Union. Even rearmament is now on the table. When it comes to the crunch, however, political commitment is often lacking. National industrial interests, fiscal caution and short electoral cycles attenuate the promise of collective capability. Europe, too, appears to be waiting for opportunities created elsewhere rather than shaping them itself. 

Like every other actor, the EU is making a series of implicit calculations. Perhaps the United States will return to business as usual after the next election cycle, at least to a degree sufficient to keep the transatlantic relationship alive. Perhaps symbolic signalling will suffice, allowing the EU to buy time to accomplish the costly buildup of military capabilities while not neglecting the welfare state. Perhaps the promise of EU membership for Ukraine will be enough for now, postponing the difficult and costly task of following through. The messaging remains mixed.

The price of strategy and possible returns on investment

Opportunism can be a useful strategy for the weak, covering up their lack of resources. It shields political leaders by limiting exposure. After all, in the absence of clear commitments there is less likelihood of having to admit failure. In the foreign policy sphere, however, merely muddling through in the forlorn hope of exploiting opportunities corrodes trust in leaders’ ability to actually lead. Partners hedge, adversaries see how far they can go and citizens question the validity of long-term promises. Across the board, the opportunist strategy is costing leaders both credibility and popularity.

True strategy carries much greater risk. It requires prioritisation, commitment of resources and leadership, as well as the clear definition of goals, allies and enemies, all of which comes at a price. But a more proactive approach may also shape the environment and open up opportunities instead of just waiting for them to arise. True strategy may also mobilise societies and mould expectations, domestically and abroad. The danger is that the current opportunistic stalemate won’t last forever. At some point, conditions will force choices that can no longer be postponed. The question is not whether strategy will return to European politics, but whether it will be adopted purposefully or imposed by events.