Arming Ourselves into the Past? Europe’s Defence Needs More Than Just Money

Money alone does not make a capable army

After the war against Georgia in 2008 – which the Russian leadership viewed as sobering despite its military success – Moscow launched a sweeping reform of its armed forces. The military was to become leaner, more flexible, and equipped with modern systems. This transformation was backed by an enormous rearmament programme totalling around €500 billion. The goal: a force capable of global reach and regional dominance.

Russia’s early successes appeared to validate the reform: the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the intervention in Syria from 2015 unfolded smoothly from Moscow’s perspective. But that image proved deceptive. Designed for rapid, specialized interventions, the Russian military failed to meet the demands of full-scale war in Ukraine from 2022 onwards. Poor logistics, outdated equipment, a lack of precision munition, and insufficient command structures revealed the deep cracks in the reform model. The massive rearmament programme could not compensate, but instead highlighted the growing gap between financial input and operational output.

Russia’s modernisation drive cannot be directly compared to current rearmament efforts in Germany or the EU. Russia is an autocratic state plagued by corruption and opacity. But it is nonetheless worth examining the structural pitfalls of such large-scale military undertakings. Even in democracies – such as with the US F-35 programme, the UK’s Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, or Germany’s Puma infantry fighting vehicle – a similar pattern is emerging: where strategic vision is lacking, innovation is stifled, or political pressure drives short-term fixes, even well-intentioned procurement projects falter. Russia may be an extreme case, but the structural challenges of military transformations are not exclusive to autocracies.

The lesson for Europe

Russia’s experience holds an important lesson for Europe: Money alone does not make a capable army. Yet many political debates in Germany and the EU suggest the opposite – that financial investments automatically translate into military strength. Without a clear strategy, spending alone will not simply not suffice.

This is already visible. Instead of bold structures, new technologies, and open partnerships, many national defence plans are leaning towards traditional contractors, legacy platforms, and conventional war scenarios. Delays and dysfunction in European flagship projects – from sixth-generation fighter platforms to the MGCS tank and digital battlefield support – show that even democratic systems struggle with sluggish procurement processes and a lack of strategic clarity.

Europe must be cautious not to arm itself for the past

Security arises not from sheer budget increases, but from strategic intelligence, openness to innovation, and the willingness to address a wide range of possible future conflicts. A resilient European defence architecture demands more than rhetoric and a handful of impressive procurement contracts – it requires the political will for real transformation and a clear strategic compass.